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Capital Structure, Labor Relations, and Determinants of Voluntary  
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
Elizabeth O. Kohl, Ph.D. 
University of Connecticut, 2015 
 
I examine the influence of labor, debtholders, and customers on the determinants of 
voluntary, stand-alone CSR report initiation. Exploring the influence of these stakeholder 
groups expands our understanding of how the demand for voluntary non-financial 
disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting, arises and provides a model to reduce selection 
bias in future CSR studies. I expect that CSR reports are relevant to employees who 
possess unemployment aversion and debtholders mindful of default risk. Consequently, 
when these stakeholders are more influential at a given firm, there should be a greater 
propensity to disclose CSR activities. Further, I posit that there can be an interactive 
effect between these two stakeholder groups on the propensity to disclose. Consistent 
with my predictions, I find firms with high labor pressure, a high degree of leverage, and 
greater advertising intensity are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities. I also 
find the odds of CSR reporting are statistically higher as leverage increases in a sample 
with high labor pressure, as compared to a sample with low labor pressure. My findings 
suggest labor and debtholders influence voluntary CSR reporting and also that labor-
related capital structure strategy influences voluntary non-financial disclosure activity. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Despite the increasing frequency of voluntary corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosures, the current literature provides limited information on what motivates a 
firm’s CSR disclosure decision (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011). In this study, I 
examine the influence of labor, debtholders, and customers on determinants of voluntary, 
stand-alone CSR disclosures (reports) in order to expand our understanding of how the 
demand for voluntary non-financial disclosure arises and the influence of production-
related frictions and capital structure strategy on firms’ voluntary disclosure activities. 
CSR reports are internally generated documents that outline economic, 
environmental, and social policies; actions; and commitments of the firm to 
stakeholders.1 The number of publicly traded United States (US) firms issuing stand-
alone CSR reports is relatively small – approximately 400 firms in 2012, corresponding 
to five percent of firms listed in Compustat’s North America Fundamentals Annual – but 
CSR reporters represent 51 percent of the S&P 500. Although there are fewer CSR 
issuances in the US than abroad, CSR reports have been increasing in frequency in the 
last decade. Since 2002, CorporateRegister.com reports a 353 and 333 percent increase in 
domestic and global CSR reporting, respectively.2  
With an emphasis on shareholder-value impact, the extant accounting literature 
finds CSR reporting is associated with better analyst coverage (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, 
Tsang, and Yang 2012), an increase in institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), a 
reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), higher earnings quality 
(Kim, Park, and Wier 2012), tax avoidance (Watson 2015), and positive reputational 
                                                 
1 An outline of recommended content for CSR reports can be found in Appendix 1. 
2 This trend is easily seen in Figure 1, which depicts the annual issuance of all CSR reports from 2002 to 2012 for US 
(Figure 1A) and global (Figure 1B) firms. 
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effects (Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Although shareholder-value of CSR has been documented, CSR 
reports contain information directly related to, and often targeting, many stakeholders 
(Boston College 2010). There is little evidence regarding the usefulness of reporting to 
stakeholders (Healy and Palepu 2001), but CSR reports represent a unique setting in 
which to further explore the influence of several stakeholder groups on voluntary 
disclosure activities. 
The first stakeholder group I examine is labor. Employees apply economic, social, 
and regulatory pressure on the firm. Although the strength of individual employees varies 
from firm to firm, prior research finds that when employees unionize, their collective 
bargaining power can influence compensation (Matsa 2010), accounting choice 
(D’Souza, Jacob, and Ramesh 2001), tax aggressiveness (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 
2013), equity value of the firm (Lee and Mas 2012), and influence firms to miss mean 
consensus analysts’ estimates (Bova 2013). The extant literature examining the 
relationship between unionized employees and voluntary disclosure suggests 
management is incentivized to remain opaque when facing strong labor (Depoers 2000; 
Hilary 2006; Bova 2013). These studies suggest unionized employees use voluntary 
disclosures to extract above-market rents during the collective bargaining process, 
encouraging firms with strong employee stakeholders to decrease voluntary disclosures in 
order to maintain their bargaining position. 
I build on economic theory advocating that given the cost of unemployment, 
workers require compensation in the form of higher wages, additional benefits, or 
improved working conditions to compensate for unemployment risk (Matsa 2010). Labor 
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unions bargain for groups of workers collectively and seek to maximize employee 
compensation functions to offset unemployment risk, but Leap (1991) finds that unions 
generally do not have access to an employer’s production, financial, or personnel 
information.3 I suggest that voluntary disclosures represent a vehicle for the firm to 
communicate unemployment risk offsets. Unlike financial disclosures examined by prior 
studies, voluntary CSR reports provide firm-wide, labor-specific information, which may 
include: employee diversification statistics; training and education information; ethics 
policies; benefits; and volunteerism.4 Global Reporting Index guidelines also suggest 
CSR reports contain disclosures on the sustainability of the firm. With employee-specific 
content, CSR disclosures should represent an opportunity for firms to offset informational 
demands of labor unions and mitigate unemployment risk by disclosing non-financial 
personnel information, providing a long-term outlook for the firm, and disclosing 
information on employee benefits and working conditions. Given the content and long-
term outlook of voluntary CSR disclosures, I posit that CSR reports are relevant to 
employees who possess unemployment aversion. In contrast to prior research that finds 
bargaining pressure from unionized employees decreases voluntary disclosure, I expect 
that firms facing strong labor pressure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone 
CSR reports than their counterparts. 
The second stakeholder group I examine in this study is debtholders. Extant 
accounting research finds that voluntary disclosures can be used to decrease the 
perception of default risk (Sengupta 1998), and studies by Weber, Scholz, and Michalik 
                                                 
3 The National Labor Relations Board requires “good faith” collective bargaining. Unions must request desired 
information and that information must be relevant to the bargaining process as well as not “unduly burdensome” to 
furnish. Typical information requests include employee wage information, benefits information, and terms/conditions 
of employment.  
4 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) includes CSR disclosure guidelines for both labor and human rights. For more 
details on these suggested disclosures, see Appendix 1. 
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(2010) and Weber (2012) suggest social and environmental risks are relevant components 
in debtholder assessment of default risk. Although CSR disclosures, which provide a 
long-term outlook and contain both social and environmental content, appear to be a tool 
for default risk management, the debtholder-specific CSR literature focuses on 
consequences of CSR performance rather than debt as a determinant of voluntary, stand-
alone CSR disclosure. In the finance literature, Goss and Roberts (2011) note firms with 
CSR concerns pay 7 to 18 basis points more on private loans, but they find no evidence 
that lenders reward CSR performance. Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh (2013) use a 
similar measure of CSR performance and find credit rating agencies tend to award 
relatively high ratings to firms with good CSR performance. Little is known about what 
drives the limited debt-CSR findings, but in effort to shed light on these results, I 
examine the influence of debt on the likelihood of a firm to initiate voluntary, stand-alone 
CSR reporting. Voluntary CSR disclosures should represent an opportunity for firms to 
signal a long-term outlook and address environmental and social risks embedded in 
default calculations. Therefore, I posit that firms facing high levels of debt in their capital 
structure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their 
counterparts. 
Additionally, I consider how market frictions between stakeholders influence 
capital structure and voluntary disclosure activities. Graham and Leary (2011) note that 
the incentive effects of capital structure can affect contracting between the firm and non-
financial stakeholders, including employees. The relationship between debt and employee 
stakeholders is further examined by Matsa (2010) who finds that for an additional 10 
percent unionization, a firm is likely to experience approximately a 100 basis point 
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increase in leverage. Matsa suggests firms facing unionization take on debt as an eventual 
bargaining device. As a consequence of increasing leverage, the firm increases default 
risk and debt servicing, simultaneously moderating employee access to free cash flows 
and increasing unemployment risk. This capital structure strategy does not reduce 
employee demand for relief from unemployment risk, but it does limit employee access 
to pecuniary compensation. Given the content of CSR reports, I posit that firms engaging 
in capital structure strategy related to labor frictions are more likely to engage in 
voluntary CSR reporting as a form of non-pecuniary compensation used to offset higher 
levels of unemployment risk. Interacting debt and employee stakeholder characteristics 
provides a better understanding of the determinants of voluntary, stand-alone CSR 
reporting in a firm with complex, production-related market frictions. 
Finally, I examine the influence of customers on voluntary CSR reporting. The 
CSR reports examined in this study are professional, stand-alone documents released by 
firms to the public and easily interpreted as marketing tools. Emphasizing the importance 
of customer stakeholders on CSR reporting, marketing literature finds that CSR reports 
have a positive impact on global brand equity, awareness, image, credibility, and 
engagement (Hoeffler and Keller 2002; Torres, Bijmolt, Tribó, and Verhoef 2012). 
However, customer influence on CSR reporting is uncertain as research in marketing also 
suggests that CSR can lead to higher levels of perceived hypocrisy and negative 
reputation, with customers believing that CSR reports are used only to further the self-
interest of the company (Knight and Greenberg 2002; Prout 2006; Wagner, Lutz, and 
Weitz 2009).  
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I empirically examine the influence of labor, debtholders, capital structure, and 
customers on CSR activities between the years 2002 and 2012 by using CSR report data 
from CorporateRegister.com and unionization data from the Union Membership and 
Coverage Database. CSR reporting is voluntary and unregulated. As firms are not 
required to consistently issue CSR reports, I examine the decision to initiate voluntary, 
stand-alone CSR reporting. Labor pressure is used to proxy for the influence of labor on 
voluntary disclosure decisions. Labor pressure is a measure of employee bargaining 
power with the firm and a function of the percentage of employees participating in 
collective bargaining (the unionization rate) as well as the importance of employees to 
the production function of the firm (the labor to capital ratio). The unionization rate is 
provided by the Union Membership and Coverage Database and the labor to capital ratio 
is employees to total assets (Hilary 2006; Chen, Chen, and Liao 2011; Chen, Chen, and 
Wang 2012).5 A firm-specific leverage ratio is used to proxy for the influence of 
debtholders and customer influence on CSR activities is measured via advertising 
intensity, the ratio of reported annual advertising expense divided by average total assets 
(Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Casey and Grenier 2014). 
I find firms with high labor pressure and firms with a high degree of leverage in 
the prior year are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year. 
This is consistent with CSR reporting mitigating unemployment risk and default risk. 
Further, interacting leverage and labor pressure, I find that the effect of debt in a firm’s 
capital structure on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting is greater at higher 
levels of labor pressure. This suggests firms with both high labor pressure and high levels 
of debt in their capital structure are more likely to initiate CSR disclosures. Partitioning 
                                                 
5 For a more detailed description of the labor pressure variable, see Appendix 2. 
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the sample into high and low levels of labor pressure, I find the effect of additional 
leverage on the firm’s likelihood of issuing a CSR report is only significant when 
employees exert higher levels of labor pressure. These findings support that labor-related 
capital structure strategy influences voluntary disclosure activity.  
Prior voluntary disclosure literature emphasizes the relationship between equity 
drivers, such as investors and analysts, and management’s propensity to engage in 
voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006; Dhaliwal 
et al. 2011). I contribute to the literature, expanding our understanding of how the 
demand for voluntary disclosure arises, by considering disclosure frictions and demands 
generated by an interactive system of stakeholders. Specifically, I examine the influence 
of frictions generated by the firm’s production function on management’s propensity to 
issue voluntary CSR disclosure and document the firm-level influence of labor and 
capital structure on voluntary disclosure.  
I add to the literature regarding organized labor’s influence on voluntary 
disclosure, extending the traditional research of Depoers (2000), Hilary (2006), and Bova 
(2013) beyond financial disclosure. My findings expand our understanding of labor’s 
influence on firm activities, namely voluntary CSR disclosure. I also contribute to the 
debt-CSR literature, shedding light on debt as a determinant of voluntary CSR disclosure 
and the influence of capital structure policy on voluntary disclosure activity. I show our 
understanding of voluntary disclosure is improved by considering the conditional 
influences of stakeholders on disclosure decisions. I suggest that capital structure strategy 
used to manage labor cost influences debt structure, financial reporting, and also has a 
spillover influence on voluntary disclosure, providing an opportunity for future research 
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to examine the spillover effect of stakeholder interactions on voluntary disclosure and 
financial reporting. Finally, I contribute to future Corporate Social Responsibility 
research by providing a model to control for selection bias related to the CSR disclosure 
decision. The model in this paper can be used as the first step in two-staged research 
designs considering the consequences of CSR reporting and CSR quality.  
 
II. Hypothesis Development  
As more firms issue voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports each 
year, research on why these voluntary, non-regulated disclosures are provided continues 
to expand. Prior accounting research takes a shareholder-centric approach and focuses on 
the benefits of CSR reporting related to decreasing the cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et 
al. 2011), improving analyst coverage and forecasts (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), and increasing 
institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Additional research has also been conducted 
on how CSR reporting influences earnings management (Kim et al. 2012), corporate tax 
policy (Watson 2015), and the potential reputational benefits of CSR report assurance 
(Simnett et al. 2009; Pflugrath et al. 2011). Although the extant research finds equity-side 
benefits of CSR reporting, these voluntary disclosures contain a wide array of 
stakeholder-specific information, including information relating to: environmental 
concerns/strategy, diversity, employee relations, human rights, corporate governance, and 
community. The stakeholder information content of stand-alone CSR reports suggests 
that shareholder-oriented motivations for CSR reporting are not the complete story.6 
                                                 
6 The most widely used measure of CSR performance, the CSR rating provided by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
Research & Analytics (KLD), supports the theory that CSR reports are stakeholder oriented. MSCI, the parent 
company of KLD, notes its KLD ratings – as seen in Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Goss and Roberts 
2011; Attig et al 2013; Kim et al. 2012 – address a company’s environmental, social and governance performance in 
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Both Healy and Palepu (2001) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) note there is little 
academic evidence regarding the value of reporting to stakeholders. As voluntary, stand-
alone disclosures with a stakeholder emphasis, CSR reports represent a unique 
opportunity to examine the influence of stakeholders on voluntary disclosure and a forum 
for future research on the benefits, both financial and managerial, of voluntary 
disclosures on stakeholder interaction. The remainder of this section offers a brief review 
of stakeholder theory as it relates to CSR reporting, followed by the development of my 
hypotheses regarding the relationships between voluntary CSR reporting and labor 
pressure and capital structure. 
 
A. Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory suggests that management is influenced not only by the desire 
to maximize shareholder wealth, but also by the relationships and contracts of other 
parties within the system of the firm. Milton Friedman (1970) wrote that the mere 
existence of CSR was a signal of an agency problem within the firm, but Edward 
Freeman (1983) cited stakeholder theory to assert that managers must satisfy a variety of 
constituents who can influence firm outcomes.  
Aguinis and Glavas (2012) review CSR literature from 588 journal articles and 
102 books across the fields of management, ethics, marketing, psychology, organizational 
behavior, and organizational studies. The authors define CSR as “context-specific 
organizational actions and policies that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and 
the triple bottom line of economic, social, and environmental performance” (consistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
the context of five categories, covering key corporate stakeholders: environment, community and society, employees 
and supply chain, customers and governance and ethics (MSCI Research 2010).  
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with Aguinis 2011; Rupp 2011; and Rupp, Williams, and Aguilera 2010). Aguinis and 
Glavas (2012) summarize that stakeholders attempting to influence firms to engage in 
CSR include: shareholders, consumers, the media, the local community, and interest 
groups. Empirically, the management literature finds little evidence to suggest that 
managers taking a wider stakeholder view will jeopardize interests of stockholders (Bird, 
Hall, Momentè, and Reggianni 2007). 
Early accounting studies by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) posit that management’s accounting choices are systematically 
affected by firm contracts. Their theories were empirically examined by Bowen, 
DuCharme, and Shores (1995) who find that accounting method choice is influenced by a 
range of stakeholders, including: customers, suppliers, employees, and short-term 
creditors. Richardson and Welker (2001) examine the relation between financial and 
social disclosure and the cost of equity capital for Canadian firms in the early 1990’s. In 
concluding their research, the authors proposed that social disclosures might benefit the 
firm through their effects on organizational stakeholders other than equity investors.  
In 2012, Dhaliwal et al. published an empirical examination of international, 
stand-alone CSR reports. The authors do not examine the influence of specific 
stakeholders on CSR reporting, but their findings – that the issuance of stand-alone CSR 
reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error – are stronger in countries that are 
more stakeholder-oriented, where a broad spectrum of stakeholders are seen by society as 
possessing a legitimate interest in corporate activities and maximizing shareholder value 
is not the only objective of the firm. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) acknowledge that the US is 
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not a pure stakeholder country, but they posit, nonetheless, that US media, marketing, 
strategy, labor relations, and regulation could relate to CSR. 
  Like shareholders, debtholders and employees hold contracts with the firm that 
arise optimally in response to particular market frictions. Unlike shareholders who are 
exposed to upside risk, debtholders and employees are, respectively, more sensitive to 
default risk and unemployment risk. Exploring the influence of labor and debtholders 
expands our understanding of how the demand for voluntary non-financial disclosure, 
embodied by CSR reporting, arises and provides a foundation for future examination of 
the full economic costs and benefits of CSR reporting. 
 
B. Labor Pressure 
Employees act as both a claimant on firm cash flows and a component of the 
firm’s production function. Labor also applies economic pressure via compensation and 
tax compliance, social pressure through community and reputation, and regulatory 
pressure from government agencies such as the United States Department of Labor. The 
influence of employees as a stakeholder group varies from firm to firm, industry to 
industry, but when employees elect to bargain collectively for wages and benefits, the 
extant literature suggests that employees recognize positive gains in bargaining power 
and the ability to exert economic pressure on management and other stakeholders, 
hereafter referred to as “labor pressure”.7 Labor pressure has been found to influence 
accounting choice (D’Souza et al. 2001), tax aggressiveness (Chyz et al. 2013), equity 
                                                 
7 Labor pressure is, hereafter, defined as the economic influence of employees on the firm. I consider the social and 
regulatory pressure in additional analysis found in Section V, Part D. 
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value of the firm (Lee and Mas 2012), and management’s incentive to signal a negative 
outlook (Bova 2013).  
The extant literature examining the relationship between unionized employees 
and voluntary disclosure suggests management is incentivized to remain opaque when 
facing strong labor. Reynolds, Masters, and Moser (1998) and Kleiner and Bouillon 
(1988) note that firm disclosures – such as: financial condition, productivity, future 
investments, and relative wages – increase wages and benefits for employees. The 
authors suggest that information sharing on the part of the firm increases bargaining 
power for American unions. Reynolds et al. (1998) find firms with organized labor are 
incentivized to hoard information in order to maintain bargaining power with unions. 
These findings are consistent with Depoers (2000), who examined voluntary disclosures 
in French firms and found that as labor pressure increases, voluntary disclosure 
decreases. 
Hilary (2006) regressed bid-ask spreads and analyst coverage against a measure 
of labor pressure. Although the author does not examine raw disclosures, he suggests 
collective bargaining creates information asymmetry in the financial markets and can 
have negative effects on firm disclosure. Bova (2013) examines 103 firms with collective 
bargaining contracts and finds unionized firms are more likely than a non-unionized 
control group to miss mean consensus analysts’ earnings forecast. Further, the author 
suggests unionized firms appear to signal a negative outlook regardless of when 
collective bargaining agreement negotiations take place. The author’s results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers of unionized firms seek to manipulate 
information signals when contracting with unionized employees. 
13 
 
Prior studies suggest unionized employees use voluntary disclosures to extract 
above-market rents during the collective bargaining process, encouraging firms with 
strong employee stakeholders to decrease voluntary disclosures. I add to the literature 
regarding organized labor’s influence on voluntary disclosure, extending the traditional 
research of Depoers (2000), Hilary (2006), and Bova (2013) beyond financial disclosure.  
Unlike shareholders, who face little downside risk other than the loss of their 
individual investments, employees are exposed to job loss (unemployment risk) in the 
event of firm termination. Matsa (2010) suggests that given the cost of unemployment, 
workers require compensation in the form of higher wages, additional benefits, or 
improved working conditions to compensate for unemployment risk. Representing groups 
of workers, labor unions seek to maximize employee compensation functions to offset 
unemployment risk. The extant economic literature finds unionized employees exert 
greater compensation pressure than their non-unionized counterparts, historically 
garnering premiums between 13 and 22 percent (Bratsburg and Ragan 2002). 
Furthermore, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2012 Union Members report notes 
unionized employees have median usual weekly earnings that are 27 percent higher than 
those who were not union members (2013). 
To maximize compensation, unionized employees engage in collective bargaining 
with the firm. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) requires “good faith” 
collective bargaining between labor unions and employees. In seeking information to 
improve their bargaining position, unions are entitled to make information requests of the 
firm, but that information must be relevant to the bargaining process as well as not 
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unduly burdensome to furnish.8 Despite the informational provisions of collective 
bargaining, Leap (1991) argues that unions generally do not have access to an employer’s 
production, financial, or personnel information. 
Prior research focuses on the relationship between voluntary financial disclosure 
and unionized employees. Unlike financial disclosures examined by prior studies, 
voluntary CSR reports provide firm-wide, employee-specific information, which may 
include: employee diversification statistics, training and education information, ethics 
policies, benefits, and volunteerism.9 With employee-specific content, CSR disclosures 
should represent an opportunity for firms to offset informational demands of labor unions 
and mitigate unemployment risk by disclosing non-financial personnel information, 
providing a long-term outlook for the firm, and disclosing information on employee 
benefits and working conditions.  
Although prior research finds bargaining pressure from unionized employees 
decreases voluntary disclosure, I suggest that voluntary CSR disclosures can be used to 
mitigate unemployment risk and firms facing strong labor pressure are more likely to 
issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their counterparts: 
 
                                                 
8 The concept “relevant to the bargaining process” is important as some firms engage in collective bargaining with 
more than one unit of unionized employees. The Boeing Company, for example, discloses in their 2011 Form 10-K that 
they have principal collective bargaining agreements with: The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers (IAM), The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), and The United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Boeing bargains with each labor 
union individually and is incentivized to maintain high levels of information asymmetry in order to improve their 
bargaining position with each unit.  
9 CSR reports and their content are voluntary and unregulated. As such, disclosures vary from firm to firm. As of 2012, 
approximately 50% of all US CSR reporters adhered to the CSR content guidelines issued by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). An outline of CSR content per the GRI index can be found in Appendix 1. 
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H1: The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social 
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s prior year labor 
pressure. 
 
C. Capital Structure 
The extant accounting literature generally examines voluntary CSR initiation 
from a shareholder perspective. Unlike shareholders, debtholders are highly sensitive to 
downside risk – the likelihood a firm terminates or files for bankruptcy. Prior research 
suggests CSR activity helps mitigate debtholder exposure to downside risk, specifically 
default risk (Sharfman and Fernando 2008; Attig et al. 2013; Weber et al. 2010; Weber 
2012), but the extant literature focuses on the consequences of CSR performance on 
capital structure rather than the influence of debt as a determinant of voluntary CSR 
reporting. 
Goss and Roberts (2011) examine private loans between 1996 and 2006 and find 
firms with CSR concerns pay 7 to 18 basis points more on private loans. However, using 
a modified KLD score of CSR performance, they find no evidence that private lenders 
reward CSR investment. Also utilizing a modified KLD score, Attig et al. (2013) find 
credit rating agencies tend to award relatively high ratings to firms with good CSR. The 
authors examine long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor’s for 1,585 
unique firms over the period 1991 to 2010. Attig et al. (2013) posit that credit analysts 
view CSR activities favorably in their rating decision because the resulting improvements 
in long-term sustainability decrease the probability of default risk. 
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Both Goss and Roberts (2011) and Attig et al. (2013) examine the relationship 
between CSR performance and debtholders, where CSR performance is measured using 
an external rating of CSR activity – the KLD assessment of CSR performance.10 I 
contribute to the debt-CSR literature by examining the influence of debtholders on the 
propensity for raw voluntary non-financial disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting. I 
build from the extant research which finds that voluntary disclosures can be used to 
decrease the perception of default risk (Sengupta 1998) and bank surveys conducted by 
Weber et al. (2010) and Weber (2012) finding social and environmental risks are relevant 
components in debtholder assessment of default risk. I focus not on the ability of CSR 
performance to mitigate default risk, but the ability of voluntary CSR disclosures to 
provide a long-term outlook as well as social and environmental information relevant to 
debtholders. Given the inferences above, I suggest that firms facing high levels of debt in 
their capital structure are more likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than 
their counterparts:  
 
H2: The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social 
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the level of debt in the 
firm’s prior year capital structure.  
  
                                                 
10 MSCI ESG Research acquired KLD Research & Analytics Inc. and is the current compiler of the MSCI ESG Stats 
database, formerly known as the KLD database. The database includes environmental, social and governance 
performance indicators for the largest 3,000 US companies since 2003, the largest 1,000 companies since 2001, and for 
approximately 650 companies every year back to 1991. KLD data are widely used in CSR studies. 
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D. Labor Pressure and Capital Structure 
In developing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I consider the independent influence of 
employee and debt stakeholders on the likelihood of the firm initiating voluntary CSR 
disclosures. But both the economic and finance literature suggests labor and 
unemployment risk impact corporate financing decisions (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner 
2010; Graham and Leary 2011; Agrawal and Matsa 2013) and corporate financing 
decisions impact collective bargaining positions with unionized labor (Brander and Lewis 
1986; Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez 2012; Matsa 2010). Further, classical 
economic theory suggests the production function of a firm requires both labor (human 
capital) and capital (financial capital). As such, I consider the interactive influence of 
labor and debt on voluntary, stand-alone CSR disclosure. 
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) suggest unemployment risk associated with human 
capital influences financial policies and capital structure. The authors examine the impact 
of unemployment risk on financing decisions and find declining unemployment risk 
(increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits), leads to increases in corporate 
leverage. When examining the relationship between labor and capital structure, other 
studies focus on unemployment risk associated with bankruptcy. Graham and Leary 
(2011) review empirical capital structure research, noting leverage increases risk for 
employee stakeholders who are exposed to unemployment risk in the event of 
bankruptcy. 
In the extant finance literature, Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) examine the 
relationships between capital structure, human capital, and bankruptcy. Building from 
economic insights, the authors derive an optimal compensation contract for firms with 
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access to both equity and debt. In this setting, Berk et al. (2010) find that if the firm 
cannot make interest payments at the contracted wage level, the employee takes a 
temporary pay cut to ensure full payment of the debt and persistence of the firm. The 
findings suggest employees are sensitive to capital structure. Berk et al. (2010) go on to 
examine the impact of bankruptcy on employees. The authors note that in bankruptcy, 
firms can abrogate contracts and employees can be terminated and replaced with more 
productive employees. Berk et al. (2010) suggest that entrenched employees face 
substantial costs from bankruptcy filings – specifically, in the event of bankruptcy, these 
employees will be forced to take a wage cut and earn a current market wage. The authors 
posit that, ceteris paribus, higher leverage should be associated with higher wages to 
offset bankruptcy risks. As previously noted, unionized employees enjoy a strong wage 
premium relative to non-unionized employees. Building on the theories of Berk et al. 
(2010), unionized employees, therefore, are likely to be more sensitive to default risk due 
to the exposure to both wage premium loss and unemployment.  
Employee sensitivity to default risk describes only one piece of the labor and 
capital structure relationship. Similar to Berk et al. (2010), Brander and Lewis (1986) 
suggest firms with substantial debt can argue employees must take a pay cut to help the 
firm avoid (emerge from) financial distress. The authors then go on to suggest 
management can use debt as a negotiating tool with employees. Matsa (2010) builds on 
these studies and finds for an additional 10 percent unionization, a firm is likely to 
experience approximately a 100 basis point increase in the debt ratio. Matsa (2010) 
suggests firms facing unionization take on debt as an eventual bargaining device to 
mitigate wage premiums associated with collective bargaining. Benmelech et al. (2012) 
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examine collective bargaining specifically within the airline industry during periods of 
financial distress. The authors find, in periods of distress, airlines are able to obtain wage 
concessions from employees whose pension plans are underfunded. Their findings are 
consistent with the theory that default risk plays an important role in collective 
bargaining. 
The down side to firms strategically using debt as a bargaining shield is that 
increasing debt ratios enough to shield cash flows from employees also increases default 
risk and debt servicing while simultaneously moderating employee access to free cash 
flows and increasing unemployment risk. This capital structure strategy does not reduce 
employee demand for relief from unemployment risk, but it does limit employee access 
to pecuniary compensation. Although constrained with respect to wage maximization in 
the face of a highly levered firm, where financial resources are more likely to be 
prioritized to debt, the objective of the labor union remains - mitigate unemployment risk 
by maximizing the components of compensation. Restraint of firm financial resources 
therefore shifts labor pressure to non-wage compensation, such as additional benefits or 
improved working conditions. Given the content of CSR reports, I posit that firms 
engaging in capital structure strategy related to labor frictions are more likely to engage 
in voluntary CSR reporting as a form of non-pecuniary compensation used to offset 
higher levels of unemployment risk. Therefore, I suggest that firms facing simultaneously 
high levels of labor pressure and high levels of debt in their capital structure are more 
likely to issue voluntary, stand-alone CSR reports than their counterparts:  
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H3: The effect of debt in the prior year’s capital structure of the firm on the likelihood 
of a firm to initiate CSR reporting is greater at higher levels of labor pressure. 
 
E. Customer Influence 
In this study, customer focus is management’s awareness and perceived 
importance of the firm’s customer constituency. Customers are a significant stakeholder 
group and many firms invest heavily in relationship marketing to create, sustain, and 
enhance close relationships with their customers, assuming such investments lead to 
positive financial outcomes (Mende, Bolton and Bitner 2013). For over a decade, 
marketing research has been investigating the relationship and value of environmental 
and social disclosures with respect to customer stakeholders.  
Building from prior branding literature, Hoeffler and Keller (2002) posit that 
corporate social marketing can enhance customer brand metrics, including equity, 
awareness, image, credibility, feelings, a sense of community, and engagement. Werther 
and Chandler (2005) suggest that customer loyalty is connected to CSR, which acts as 
implicit brand insurance. The authors state that the linkage between stakeholders and 
brands is the purpose of branding. As the value of the relationship grows, so does the 
strategic importance of CSR, which represents conflict prevention between customers 
and the firm and can be thought of as modern day boiler insurance (Werther and 
Chandler 2005). 
CSR and customer relationships have also been empirically examined in the 
marketing literature. Torres et al. (2012) examine 57 global brands from 2002 to 2008 
and find that CSR reporting targeting stakeholders (customers, shareholders, employees, 
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suppliers, and community) has a positive impact on global brand equity. Luo and 
Bhattacharya (2006) also conduct an empirical examination of the relationship between 
CSR and customer stakeholders. The authors examine under what conditions CSR results 
in positive financial performance. Luo and Bhattacharya find CSR reports are associated 
with market value, but customer satisfaction partially mediates this relationship. The 
authors also find that in firms with low innovativeness capability, CSR actually reduces 
customer satisfaction levels and, through lowered satisfaction, harms market value – a 
function they refer to as “the dark side of CSR”. 
  Wagner et al. (2009) describe CSR activities as proactive and reactive. They find 
proactive communication strategy (when the firm’s CSR statements precede conflicting 
observed behavior) leads to higher levels of perceived hypocrisy than a reactive strategy 
(when the firm’s CSR statements follow observed behavior). Wagner et al. also note that 
inconsistent information in proactive or reactive reporting increases perceptions of 
hypocrisy, such that CSR statements can actually be counterproductive.  
 Regardless of the positive or negative effect of CSR reporting, Schuler and 
Cording (2006) note customers must be aware of CSR characteristics for CSR 
differentiation to be successful. As such, I suggest that management’s focus on customers 
influences management’s decision to engage in CSR reporting activity:  
 
H4: The likelihood that a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-alone corporate social 
responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s prior year 
customer focus. 
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F. Related Studies 
My study is related to, but differs from, the 1992 study of Roberts entitled 
Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An Application of 
Stakeholder Theory. A primary difference in our studies is the CSR disclosure sample 
selection. Roberts (1992) uses data from the book Rating America’s Corporate Conscious 
(1986) compiled and published by the US Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). The 
CEP samples 130 large Fortune 500 corporations in 1984, 1985 and 1986, rating the level 
of corporate social responsibility disclosures for each company included in their study. 
The dependent variable for social disclosure (CSR) in Roberts (1992) is the level of CSR 
disclosure for firm i in period t (0, poor; 1, good; 2, excellent) based on the CEP ratings. I 
examine stand-alone CSR reports issued directly by corporations. I do not consider the 
external ratings or performance of CSR, but focus instead on the initiation of voluntary 
CSR information disclosure. Roberts (1992) uses a debt to equity ratio to proxy for 
potential creditor influence on determinants of CSR and finds a positive association 
between the debt ratio and CSR disclosure. Robert’s study does not consider the 
influence of labor on voluntary CSR disclosure. 
My study is also related to, but differs from, Dhaliwal et al. (2011). Again, the 
primary difference in our studies is the CSR disclosure sample as well as my focus on 
debt and employee stakeholders. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also examines voluntary CSR 
reports, gathering data from CorporateRegister.com and directly from corporate websites. 
The period tested in their study is 1993 to 2007. I examine voluntary CSR reporting from 
2002 to 2012, updating the sample period and emphasizing an era of CSR reports that are 
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more likely to have a uniform and broad scope than early CSR issuances.11 Dhaliwal et 
al. (2011) also models determinants of CSR initiation. While debtholders are not the 
primary focus of the authors’ study, a control variable is included for financial leverage. 
Further discussion can be found in the results section of this paper. 
 
III. Sample and Methodology 
A. Sample Description 
For the period of 2002 to 2012, I collect data from three primary sources: 
CorporateRegister.com, Compustat North American Fundamentals Annual, and the 
Union Membership and Coverage Database. Table 2, Panel A, provides a breakdown of 
the sample. I begin with all observations in Compustat and drop observations missing 
total assets (AT) and values for market value of equity (SIZEMVE), Tobin’s Q 
(TOBINQ), employees (EMP), labor pressure (LP) and profitability (ROA). I am left 
with 51,957 firm-year observations spanning 8,720 firms from 2002 to 2012.  
 
[ Insert Table 2, parts A & B ] 
 
I utilize CorporateRegister.com to collect a sample of firms issuing stand-alone 
CSR reports in the United States from 2002 to 2012. CorporateRegister.com is an 
independent, privately held and self-funded organization that maintains a database of  
                                                 
11 Manually examining CSR reports from CorporateRegister.com, I note a shift between the years 2000 and 2002 in the 
emphasis of firm’s CSR reporting. Early reports are more likely to emphasize environmental content, while more recent 
reports offer broader stakeholder content. Further, although CSR reports continue to be unregulated voluntary 
disclosures, there is a noticeable shift in the use of globally recognized content guidelines for CSR reporting post 2002. 
CorporateRegister.com reports approximately 3, 30, and 50 percent of US issuers follow GRI standards to compile 
their CSR reports in 2002, 2007, and 2012, respectively. This suggests more recent content is more likely to be both 
comprehensive and consistent than that of early period CSR reports. 
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corporate responsibility reports as well as limited descriptive information on the  
reports.12,13 Each publicly traded CSR issuer is identified and hand matched by company 
name with Compustat data.14 Table 2, Panel B, describes the CSR report sample by 
year.15  
CorporateRegister.com provides data for 2,639 US CSR reports from 2002 to 
2012. Table 2 Part B details the 1,788 CSR reports issued by 454 publicly traded firms 
meeting the criteria for the sample in this study. Of the 454 firms in the sample, 347 firms 
initiated their CSR reporting practices in the sample period. The Global Reporting 
Initiative is a non-profit organization that produces standards for sustainability reporting 
(GRI). Although few CSR reports utilized the global reporting index early in the sample, 
by 2012 approximately 50 percent of the sample is constructing their CSR reports using 
GRI guidelines.  
 
B. Empirical Models and Variables 
In this study, I test the determinants of voluntary, non-financial disclosure by 
examining the initiation of voluntary CSR reporting. As CSR disclosure policies may be 
sticky, particularly if standards are not used to create consistency across years and firms, 
                                                 
12 CorporateRegister.com populates its database via reports directly provided by firms and active research via the 
Internet and direct contact/inquiry with companies. The database features reports and reviews, but not brochures or 
marketing and related publications. CorporateRegister.com does not feature publications, which are sales material, have 
no reference year, no quantitative CR data and no statement of CR policy.  
13 Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also utilize the CorporateRegister.com database and perform a comparison of stand-alone CSR 
reports and CSR content in annual reports (10-Ks). The authors find that, on average, stand-alone CSR reports are 
significantly longer – 28.3 pages versus 1.5 pages – and cover significantly more CSR issues – 6.4 issues versus 1.5 
issues – compared to annual reports. Dhaliwal et al.’s findings are consistent with KPMG (2008), which finds that 
among the largest 100 U.S. firms, only about 1 percent of them adequately integrate CSR reports into their annual 
reports. 
14 Note, company names are matched and GVKEY’s assigned to public CSR reporters. Subsidiary companies have 
been assigned to their parent company’s GVKEY. For example: Ben & Jerry’s is a Unilever subsidiary and, therefore, 
assigned the GVKEY for Unilever. In this study, a parent company is only permitted one CSR observation per year. 
15 CorporateRegister.com occasionally lists multiple reports for a single issuer in a firm-year. In addition to the firm’s 
CSR report, these can be summary reports of the comprehensive CSR report itself or additional environmental 
disclosures. I count multiple reports as a single firm-year observation. 
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I follow the partitioning of initiating and non-initiating CSR reporters found in Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) to test the first-time issuance of stand-alone CSR reports against all other 
firms in the population. The following test is designed examine the influence of labor and 
debtholders in the prior year on the likelihood of management to initiate voluntary CSR 
reporting. The logistic regression model is specified as follows: 
 
CSR_YR1i,t  =  0  +  1LPi,t-1  +  2LEVi,t-1  +  3LEVi,t-1 *LPi,t-1   +  4ADV_INTi,t-1      (1) 
 5SIZEMVEi,t-1  +  6REGi,t-1  +  7GLOBALi,t-1  +  8PCT_CSRi,t-1  +  
9COMPETITIONi,t-1  +  10ROAi,t-1  +  11TOBINQi,t-1  +         
12LITRISKi,t-1  +  ΣINDi, t +  ΣYEARi,t  +   i,t 
 
In the model above, CSR_YR1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the first year 
(initiating year) a stand-alone CSR report is recorded for firm i in the 
CorporateRegister.com database, and 0 otherwise. Observations where CSR_YR1 are 
equal to 0 include firm years where no CSR report has been issued by a firm, as well as 
firm years in which non-initiating-year CSR reports are issued. The control group for test 
one of my hypotheses is all non-CSR-initiators. Sensitivity testing of the control sample 
can be found in Section V under CSR Report Initiation Sample. 
The first variable of interest is labor pressure (LP), which captures the economic 
influence of labor on the firm by measuring employees’ collective bargaining power, or 
their ability to make demands of the firm from a strong bargaining position. Labor 
pressure is calculated as the industry-level unionization rate times firm-level labor 
intensity (Hilary 2006; Chen et al. 2011 and 2012). Industry-level unionization rates are 
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provided by the Union Membership and Coverage Database, which is maintained 
annually by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson.16 Union data comes from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ monthly Current Population Survey and a description of the Union 
Membership Coverage Database can be found in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). I 
specifically collect Hirsch and Macpherson data on union membership, coverage, density, 
and employment by industry for the sample period. The data is provided by Census 
Industrial Classification Codes, which are then converted into NAICS codes at the two-, 
three-, four-, and five-digit level depending on specification for the CIC industry. Labor 
intensity, also referred to as the labor to capital ratio, is a measure of the sensitivity of a 
firm’s production function to labor. Labor intensity is the total number of employees 
reported scaled by total assets for each firm. Labor pressure is the interaction of the size 
of the employee’s bargaining unit and the sensitivity of the firm’s production function to 
labor. I expect that as labor pressure increases, the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
voluntary CSR reporting will also increase. For more details and examples of the labor 
pressure calculation, see Appendix 2. 
The second variable of interest is leverage (LEV). Leverage is a proxy for the 
influence of debt in a firm’s capital structure on management. LEV is defined as the ratio 
of a firm’s total debt divided by total assets for each observation year. Prior literature 
suggests social responsibility disclosures may be viewed by management as a way to 
meet certain debtholder expectations (Roberts 1992). I expect that as the influence of 
debtholders increases, the likelihood of CSR reporting will also increase. 
                                                 
16 Barry Hirsch, W.J. Usery Chair of the American Workplace in the Department of Economics at Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University, and David Macpherson, E.M. Stevens Professor of Economics at 
Trinity University provide union membership data at no charge via their website: unionstats.com. 
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To consider the relationship between labor, debtholders, and voluntary non-
financial disclosure, I include the pairwise product of LP and LEV. I expect a positive 
value for the effect of the interaction, which implies that the higher the labor pressure, the 
greater (more positive) the effect of leverage on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR 
reporting. Similarly, the higher the leverage, the greater (more positive) the effect of 
labor pressure on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting. 
The final variable of interest is advertising intensity. Advertising intensity 
(ADV_INT) is a proxy for customer focus and calculated as the ratio of reported annual 
advertising expense divided by average total assets per three-digit NAICS industry 
classification (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Casey and Grenier 2014; Servaes and 
Tamayo 2013). Cohen, Mashruwala, and Zach (2010) note promotional materials and 
direct-response advertising is included as part of the advertising expense in Compustat, 
but because Compustat has many missing data points for firm advertising expenditure, I 
use an industry-specific measure in order to preserve sample size. I do, however, perform 
sensitivity analysis wherein the sample size is reduced in order to examine the influence 
of firm-specific advertising intensity. 
I control for firm size (SIZEMVE) as size has been found to influence the firm’s 
contractual relationships, visibility, disclosure, and political pressure (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993; Healy and Palepu 2001; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Size is the market value 
of equity at the beginning of each year. As the initial investment in voluntary CSR 
reporting is relatively lower for large firms, I expect the propensity to disclose voluntary 
non-financial CSR reports is positively associated with size. I also control for regulated 
industries (REG), such as: mining, oil and gas, food and beverage, transportation, 
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communication and utilities. Social welfare contributes to the regulation of industries in 
the US and regulated industries are also subject to high levels of political pressure and 
visibility (Stigler 1971). Management literature also suggests that regulation is an 
institutional-level predictor of CSR actions and policies (Buehler and Shetty 1974; 
Fineman and Clarke 1996). As such, I control for industries classified as regulated 
following Hogan and Jeter (1999) and Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010).17  
I control for competitive market pressures to issue CSR reports at the international 
and industry levels. As issuance of CSR reports increases in international markets (see 
Figure 1), firms operating globally face greater pressure to issue CSR reports – at a 
minimum exploiting the opportunity for a lower cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 
2011). As such, I include an indicator variable (GLOBAL) equal to 1 if a firm reports 
non-zero foreign income, and 0 otherwise.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), suggest industry-specific characteristics influence CSR 
reporting. To control for industry peer pressure, I include PCT_CSR, a variable 
measuring the percentage of the top 50 firms in the three-digit NAICS industry who issue 
CSR reports. The higher the top 50 percentage, the more pressure a firm is under to 
follow the industry leaders. Under the proprietary cost hypothesis, firms’ decisions to 
disclose information are influenced by concern that such disclosures can damage their 
competitive position in product markets (Verrecchia 1983; Healy and Palepu 2001). To 
control for product competition (COMPETITION), I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
to measure competitiveness of the firm within its industry. The Herfindahl index is 
                                                 
17 Hogan and Jeter classify the following two-digit SIC codes as regulated, following Regulatory Reform: What 
Actually Happened (Weiss and Klass 1986) and Danos and Eichenseher (1982): 10, 12-14, 20, 29, 40-42, 44-46, 48, 49, 
60-64, 67. Per Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010), no regulated two-digit SIC industries have been deregulated, but two-digit 
codes 43 and 47 are also classified as regulated post 1993. 
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calculated by taking the sum of the squared market share of the 50 largest firms in each 
three-digit NAICS industry. Market share is measured as each firm’s percentage of total 
sales in its three-digit NAICS industry for the year. For industries with fewer than 50 
firms, the Herfindahl index is calculated using all firms in the industry. Finally, the 
Herfindahl index is multiplied by -1, so that firms with a larger (less negative) index 
represent firms in industries with more concentration and less competition. 
In addition to controlling for firm size, I include two control variables for the 
financial state of the firm – return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ). Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) find disclosure ratings are increasing in firm performance, and both 
marketing (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006) and accounting (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) literature 
suggest that firms with better financial performance are more likely to engage in CSR 
activities. ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets 
at the beginning of each year. TOBINQ is the control variable for firm growth. Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) find a negative and significant relationship between growth and CSR 
initiation in their 2002 to 2007 international CSR report sample. The authors suggest that 
firms in an expansionary period are more financially constrained and have fewer 
resources for CSR activities and disclosure. 
 Prior literature (Skinner 1979; Healy and Palepu 2001) documents that litigation 
risk is related to voluntary disclosure decision and that litigation potentially reduces 
incentives to provide disclosure. Litigation risk (LITRISK) is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if a firm operates in a high litigation industry and 0 otherwise.18  
                                                 
18 Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), litigation risk industries are those in the following SIC industry classifications: 
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370. 
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To control for the industry effects, I estimate the model using industry fixed 
effects (three-digit NAICS). Industry fixed effects control for the effect of a particular 
industry on the likelihood of CSR issuance. Finally, I include year fixed effects to control 
for macroeconomic events. 
 
C. Secondary Test of the Interaction Variable 
Applied economic research argues that assessing the statistical significance of 
interaction effects in nonlinear models, such as the logit model used in my study, with a 
simple statistical test on the coefficient on the interaction term is subject to complication 
(Ai and Norton 2003; Greene 2010; Ozer Balli and Sørensen 2013). Greene (2010) notes 
the interaction effect in the nonlinear model is at least partly an artifact of the functional 
form chosen (Greene 2010). Both LP and LEV are continuous variables, which further 
complicates the interpretation of the interaction in my study. To address this concern, I 
perform additional analysis by examining the effect of debtholders on voluntary CSR 
reporting at two levels of labor pressure. I bisect the sample into firms characterized as 
having lower LP (below the median) and higher LP (above the median). This test is 
designed to examine the influence of debtholders in the prior year on the likelihood of 
management to initiate voluntary CSR reporting under (I) low levels of labor influence 
and (II) high levels of labor influence. The logistic regression model is specified as 
follows: 
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CSR_YR1i,t  =  0  +  1LEVi,t-1  +  2ADV_INTi,t-1  +  3SIZEMVEi,t-1  +           (2) 
 4REGi,t-1  +  5GLOBALi,t-1   +  6PCT_CSRi,t-1  +  
 7COMPETITIONi,t-1   +  8ROAi,t-1   +  9TOBINQi,t-1   +   
 10LITRISKi,t-1   +  ΣINDi, t + ΣYEARi,t  +   i,t 
 
To control for the industry effects, I estimate the model using industry fixed effects 
(three-digit NAICS). Industry fixed effects control for the effect of a particular industry 
on the likelihood of CSR issuance. Finally, I include year fixed effects to control for 
macroeconomic events. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the full sample can be found in Table 3, 
Panel A and B, respectively. As seen in Table 3, Panel A, mean labor pressure is 
significantly lower for CSR initiators (0.0004 for initiators versus 0.0007 for non-
initiators where p < 0.01) and CSR initiators have significantly lower leverage (LEV) 
than non-initiators (p < 0.01). These statistics suggest that labor and debtholders have less 
leverage, or influence, on management of firms initiating CSR activity. Mean advertising 
intensity is not significantly different for CSR report initiators and non-initiators 
(ADV_INT: 0.0125 and 0.0115, respectively), suggesting a similar customer emphasis by 
both groups. 
  
[ Insert Table 3 ] 
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Firms initiating CSR reporting are significantly larger (SIZEMVE: 8.5387 for 
initiators and 5.1053 for non-initiators), significantly more likely to be found in a 
regulated industry (REG p < 0.01), and have a significantly higher level of global 
operations (GLOBAL: 0.6772 for initiators and 0.2903 for non-initiators). Initiating firms 
are also more likely to experience peer pressure on CSR issuance as the percentage of the 
top 50 firms (sales leaders) issuing CSR reports in their industry is significantly higher 
for initiators (PCT_CSR: 0.0559) than non-initiators (PCT_CSR: 0.0250). Competition 
within the firm’s industry is not statistically different between the sample, where 
COMPETITION is -.0808 for initiators and -0.0751 for non-initiators. 
 Financially, initiators are significantly more profitable (ROA of 0.0639) than non-
initiators (-0.3093) and significantly less likely to be experiencing high growth 
(TOBINQ: 1.6908 for initiators and 3.5650 for non-initiators). Finally, firms initiating 
CSR reports have significantly lower levels of litigation risk than their non-initiating 
counterparts (p < 0.01).  
  
B. CSR Initiation 
 I predict labor, debtholders, and customers influence firms’ CSR reporting in 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, respectively. I empirically examine the influence of these 
stakeholders on the likelihood of the firm to initiate stand-alone, voluntary CSR reports in 
test 1 below. I report regression results for Equation (1) in Table 4. Column I includes all 
first-time reporting firm-year observations. Column II includes the interaction of leverage 
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and labor pressure (LEV*LP). Columns III and IV test the robustness of the results by 
excluding utilities and limited to environmentally sensitive industries.19  
 
[ Insert Table 4 ] 
 
Across all four specifications of the dependent variable, the results support H1 and H2. 
Labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s 
likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t 
(coef: 12.414; 12.387; 12.530; 11.258 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for Columns I, II, 
III, and IV, respectively). Leverage (LEV) in year t-1 is also significantly and positively 
associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone 
CSR report in year t (coef: 0.786; 0.785; 0.827; 1.262 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.0; 0.01 for 
Columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively). H4, that customer focus (ADV_INT) in year t-1 
is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating 
the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t, is supported in all specifications of the 
dependent variable (coef: 55.942; 55.943; 55.715; 57.452 and p < 0.05; 0.05; 0.05; 0.10 
for Columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively). The marginal effect of labor pressure, 
leverage, and advertising intensity is 0.083; 0.0053; and 0.375, respectively. Thus the 
likelihood of CSR report initiation increases with all three primary variables of interest at 
a rate such that, if the rate were constant, the likelihood of CSR report initiation would 
increase by 8.3%; 0.53%; and 37.5% if labor pressure, leverage, or advertising increased 
                                                 
19 Utilities are all firms in the two-digit NAICS code 22. Environmentally sensitive industries include included in the 
US Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory Program (TRI). A detailed listing of these industries 
can be found at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/my-facilitys-six-digit-naics-code-tri-
covered-industry. Sensitivity analysis of environmental industries was conducted following Plumlee, Brown, Hayes 
and Marshall (2014) who classify the following industries as environmentally sensitive: oil & gas, chemical, food and 
beverage, pharmaceutical and electrical utilities. 
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by 1, respectively. These results suggest that when labor, debtholders, and customers are 
more influential at a given firm, there should be a greater propensity to disclose CSR 
activities. 
In my first test of H3, the interactive effect between labor and debtholders on the 
propensity to disclose, I examine the results of LEV*LP in Table 4, columns II, III, and 
IV. The interaction of debt and labor (LEV*LP) is also significantly and positively 
associated with the dependent variable across all three model specifications (coef: 2.500; 
2.508; 2.122 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for Columns II, III, and IV, respectively). This 
suggests that the higher the labor pressure, the greater (more positive) the effect of 
leverage on the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting. Similarly, the higher the 
leverage, the greater (more positive) the effect of labor pressure on the likelihood of a 
firm to initiate CSR reporting. More generally, my findings suggest the interaction 
between two stakeholder groups influence voluntary disclosure activities. 
The coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with 
expectations per the prior literature, with one significant exception: ROA. As seen in 
Table 4, ROA is positive and significant across all four specifications of the dependent 
variable with a coefficient of 1.860; 1.861; 1.846; 2.209 and p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.01; 0.01 for 
columns I, II, III, and IV, respectively. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also report a positive 
association between CSR initiation and ROA, but they do not show the relationship to be 
significant. Empirical evidence from the marketing literature (Luo and Bhatacharya 
2006) finding positive association between CSR and market value (measured using ROA) 
supports the findings in this paper suggesting ROA is positively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of a firm to initiate CSR reporting.  
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C. CSR Initiation Partitioned by Labor Pressure 
In Hypothesis 3, I predict the interaction of labor and debt influence the likelihood 
of the firm to initiate stand-alone, voluntary CSR reports. I report results for Equation (2), 
further examining the interaction between labor and debt on voluntary CSR disclosure, in 
Table 5, where Column I includes all firms with labor pressure below the median (lower) 
and Column II includes all firms with labor pressure above the median (higher).  
 
[ Insert Table 5 ] 
 
As seen in Column I, leverage (LEV) is positive (coef: 0.295) but not statistically 
significant (p > 0.10) in the sample of firms with lower levels of labor pressure. This 
suggests that in an environment in which employees have low levels of bargaining power, 
capital structure of the firm is less likely to influence firms’ decision to initiate voluntary 
CSR reporting. However, in a sample of firms with higher levels of labor pressure 
(Column II), leverage is both positive and significant (coef: 1.171 and p < 0.01) with 
respect to voluntary CSR initiation. This suggests firms with high labor pressure and a 
high degree of leverage are more likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities.  
To further test the difference between LEV (I) from the lower LP sample and 
LEV (II) from the higher LP sample, I estimate Equation 2 with the addition of two 
variables – a binary variable (HIGH) equal to 1 if labor pressure for the observation is in 
the higher partition and zero if the observation is in the lower partition. The second 
additional variable is an interaction of the new binary variable and LEV*(HIGH*LEV). 
The 1.650 coefficient on HIGH*LEV is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.10). 
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The marginal effect of leverage on CSR initiation is higher in the high LP sample (0.008) 
than the low LP sample (0.006). The marginal effects are statistically different (p < 0.01), 
again suggesting the likelihood of a firm initiating CSR reporting is greater at higher 
leverage for firms in the top half of labor pressure. Overall, the combined results of 
Columns I and II suggest capital structure strategy influences voluntary disclosure 
activity and the influence of labor on CSR reporting dominates the influence of 
debtholders. 
 
D. Odds Ratios 
Coefficients in logit models represent log-odds units and are interpreted 
differently than standard OLS coefficients. For an additional interpretation of the results, 
beyond the marginal effects related to the results found in Tables 4 and 5, I estimate the 
odds ratios of the dependent variable. Odds ratios range between zero and infinity and are 
generated from probabilities. Here, the odds ratios are the ratio of the probability of the 
binary outcome of the dependent variable, CSR report initiation. The coefficients in the 
following specification represent the odds of CSR initiation (CSR_YR1 = 1) when the 
dependent variable increases by one unit. The odds of CSR initiation increases 
(decreases) if the coefficient for the independent variable is greater than 1 (less than 1).  
 
[ Insert Table 6 ] 
 
As seen in Table 6, the odds ratios for LP, LEV, and ADV_INT are all greater than 1 
(OR: 239,598; 2.193; and greater than 1 billion, respectively) suggesting the odds of 
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voluntary CSR report initiation increases with labor pressure, debt, and customer 
awareness. The odds ratios can also be reduced to interpret the effect of the independent 
variables on CSR report initiation. For example, a 1 percent increase in LP increases the 
odds of a firm initiating CSR reporting by 2,396. Furthermore, the significant p-values 
for labor pressure, debtholders, and customer awareness seen in the CSR Initiation 
Sample results reported in Table 6 (p < 0.01; 0.01; and 0.05 for LP; LEV; and 
ADV_INT, respectively) suggest all three of the primary variables of interest have a 
significant influence on voluntary CSR report initiation. Columns I and II of Table 6 
report the results of Equation 2 with odds ratios. The odds of debtholders (LEV) 
influencing voluntary CSR report initiation are not significant in the sample with lower 
labor pressure (p > 0.10). But capital structure does have a positive influence on a firm 
initiating CSR reporting in a sample of firms with higher labor pressure (p < 0.01), where 
the odds of a firm initiating CSR disclosures increases 3.227 when LEV increases by 1 
unit. These results support the hypothesis in this study. 
 
V. Additional Analyses 
A. CSR Report Initiation Sample 
I report the results of sensitivity analysis on the CSR initiation sample in Table 6. 
I consider the timing of CSR report initiation and the use of lagged independent 
variables, as seen in Equation 1, in Column I of Table 6. Columns II and III report results 
using alternate methods for generating the control group (CSR_YR1 = 0).  
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i. Timing of Stakeholder Pressure and CSR Report Issuance   
CSR reporting is voluntary in the US and there is no standardized reporting 
deadline for firms who issue stand-alone reports. An examination of CSR Report Alerts 
from CorporateRegister.com for the period of 2011 to 2012 suggests that 78 percent of 
CSR reports are issued between May and July. Given the gap between a standard 
December 31 fiscal year end and the potential issuance month of the CSR report, 
stakeholder pressure in the year covered by the CSR report, rather than the prior year, 
could influence CSR disclosure. As such, I re-examine CSR initiation and disclosure with 
non-lagged variables of interest and controls. The results of examining CSR disclosure 
hold, in both directional association and significance. As seen in Column I of Table 7, 
Labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively associated with a firm’s 
likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report in year t 
(coef: 10.744 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers also remain significantly and 
positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation (coef: 0.833; 52.641 and p < 
0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The interactive relationship 
between LEV*LP also holds in Column I (coef: 2.327 and p < 0.05).  
 
[ Insert Table 7 ] 
 
ii. Treatment of Post-Initiation Years 
 For the primary tests in this study, observations where CSR_YR1 are equal to 0 
include firm years where no CSR report has been issued by a firm, as well as firm years 
in which non-initiating-year CSR reports are issued. I test the sensitivity of the control 
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sample in two ways. First, I drop all observations for CSR issuing firms subsequent to 
their CSR report initiation year (post-initiation drop). This treatment drops 118 firms 
from the sample that initiated CSR reporting prior to 2002, including 11 firms that did not 
engage in CSR reporting during the sample period and 107 firms who did. Dropping 
firms post-CSR initiation isolates the decision to initiate CSR reporting. This sample to 
test CSR initiation has 49,894 firm-year observations spanning 8,602 firms from 2002 to 
2012. As seen in Column II of Table 7, labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and 
positively associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a 
stand-alone CSR report in year t (coef: 14.843 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers 
also remain significantly and positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation 
(coef: 0.851; 48.969 and p < 0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The 
interactive relationship between LEV*LP also holds in the post-initiation drop results 
reported in Column II (coef: 2.993 and p < 0.01).  
For the second sensitivity analysis of the CSR initiation control sample, I again 
drop firms subsequent to their initiation of CSR reporting. But in this analysis, I only 
drop CSR reporting firms post-initiation if the firm is classified as a consistent CSR 
reporter. Consistent reporters are identified as firms that do not stop issuing stand-alone 
CSR reports in the sample period once they initiate CSR reporting. This method for 
generating the control group includes non-initiation years for non-consecutive CSR 
reporters, as these firms are likely to engage in ongoing CSR initiation decisions. As seen 
in Column III of Table 7, labor pressure (LP) in year t-1 is significantly and positively 
associated with a firm’s likelihood of voluntarily initiating the issuance of a stand-alone 
CSR report in year t (coef: 12.498 and p < 0.01). Debtholders and customers also remain 
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significantly and positively associated with voluntary CSR report initiation (coef: 0.825; 
56.234 and p < 0.01; p < 0.05, respectively for LEV and ADV_INT). The interactive 
relationship between LEV*LP also holds in Column I (coef: 2.536 and p < 0.01).  
  
B. Ongoing Voluntary CSR Reporting 
The primary tests in my study examine the influence of labor and debt on 
voluntary CSR disclosure initiation. An argument can be made that each CSR report 
released is the result of a decision to engage in voluntary disclosure. As such, I examine 
the determinants of all CSR report issuances in the sample period by following Equation 
1, but changing the dependent variable to all CSR report issuances (CSR_PUBYR): 
 
CSR_PUBYRi,t  =  0  +  1LPi,t-1  +  2LEVi,t-1  +  3LEVi,t-1 *LPi,t-1   +           (3) 
       4ADV_INTi,t-1  +  5SIZEMVEi,t-1  +  6REGi,t-1  +   
       7GLOBALi,t-1  +  8PCT_CSRi,t-1  +   9COMPETITIONi,t-1  +      
       10ROAi,t-1  +  11TOBINQi,t-1  +  12LITRISKi,t-1  +   
       ΣINDi, t +  ΣYEARi,t  +   i,t 
 
As seen in Table 7, the results from my primary examination of CSR reporting hold when 
testing is extended to all 1,788 CSR reports issued by 454 companies from 2002 to 2012. 
The coefficients for labor and debtholders are both positive and significant for all CSR 
reporters (coef: 15.628; 0.696 and p < 0.01; 0.01, respectively for LP and LEV). The 
association between customer focus and ongoing CSR report issuance is not significant, 
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but the interaction LEV*LP is consistently positive with a coefficient of 2.653 and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
[ Insert Table 8 ] 
 
Reported in Columns I and II of Table 7 are the results of a secondary test of the 
interaction variable from Equation 3. The findings in Table 5 also hold when utilizing the 
full CSR reporting sample from 2002 to 2012 to more closely examine the interaction 
between CSR reporting, labor pressure, and debt. I am unable to reject the null of 
Hypothesis 2 for the partition of the full sample that has labor pressure in the lower 50 
percent of the sample (Column I LEV coef: 0.307 and p > 0.10), whereas the coefficient 
for LEV in the upper level of labor pressure (Column II) is 0.980 and significant at the 
1% level. Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEV from the low and high 
partitioned tests of the full sample to be positive and significant (coef: 1.042 and p < 
0.01). This finding suggests the influence of labor and capital structure extend to ongoing 
stand-alone, voluntary CSR reporting. 
 
C. Consistent and Non-Consistent CSR Reporting 
The results for the primary variables of interest LEV, LP, and LEV*LP hold when 
the CSR reporting sample is constrained to firms who issue consecutive (consistent) CSR 
reports. Consistent CSR reporting firms do not stop releasing reports in the sample period 
once they have started issuing stand-alone CSR reports. The results for LEV and LP also 
hold when the sample is constrained to non-consecutive (non-consistent) CSR report 
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issuers. Non-consistent CSR reporting firms are those who either skip CSR reporting 
years or who stop issuing CSR reports after one or two years of CSR reporting activity. 
Table 9 reports the results of examining CSR initiation (Equation 1) and ongoing CSR 
reporting (Equation 2).  
 
[ Insert Table 9 ] 
 
Examining CSR report initiation, I find coefficients for both labor pressure (LP) and 
debtholder influence (LEV) are positive and significant for consistent reporters (coef: 
18.451; 0.833 and p < 0.01; 0.01) as well as for non-consistent reporters (coef: 8.304; 
0.785 and p < 0.01; 0.01). The results of LP and LEV are also consistent for ongoing 
CSR reporting by consistent reporters (coef: 12.540; 0.919 and p < 0.01; 0.01) as well as 
for non-consistent reporters (coef: 18.239; 0.549 and p < 0.01; 0.01). These findings 
support Hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as the results found in Table 4. Hypothesis 3 is also 
supported across consistent (coef: 4.613 and p < 0.01) and non-consistent reporters (coef: 
1.356 and p < 0.10). Additional testing of LEV*LP for ongoing CSR reporting is also 
supported across consistent (coef: 1.770 and p < 0.01) and non-consistent reporters (coef: 
3.319 and p < 0.01). However, when the sample is partitioned by consistent and non-
consistent reporters, customer influence is only positively and significantly associated 
with non-continuous CSR report initiators (coef: 81.448 and p < 0.05). This suggests that 
non-continuous issuers are more likely to consider CSR reporting a marketable event, as 
opposed to their continuously reporting counterparts. 
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D. Robustness of Labor Pressure 
I state in Hypothesis 1 that the likelihood a firm will initiate voluntary, stand-
alone corporate social responsibility disclosures is positively associated with the firm’s 
prior year labor pressure. The primary measure of labor pressure (LP) in this study is an 
economic measure of the influence of employees vis-à-vis extraction of economic rents 
from the firm. As an alternative to measuring economic labor pressure, I consider the 
social, reputational, and regulatory risk of labor pressure (hereafter, “labor risk”) on 
voluntary disclosure, embodied by CSR reporting. Using the “List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor or Forced Labor” released by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs (2013), I identify three-digit NAICS industries related to 
goods that are considered high risk for affiliation with child or forced labor. These 
industries are more closely monitored by federal agencies and face greater risk of 
reputational and societal effects associated with the discovery of illegal and/or unethical 
labor practices.20  I report the determinants of voluntary CSR report initiation in Table 10 
with labor risk (LP_RISK) as the primary measure of labor’s influence on CSR reporting 
(Column I). All variables of interest remain positive and statistically significant, 
including labor risk (coef: 1.484 and p < 0.05). As seen in column IV, I add back the 
economic measure of labor pressure for a comprehensive examination of labor and CSR 
reporting. I find the likelihood of voluntary CSR report initiation increases as both 
economic (LP coef: 12.387 and p < 0.01) and reputational/regulatory (LP_RISK coef: 
1.491 and p < 0.05) labor pressure increase. The results found in Table 10 support 
                                                 
20 Many firms include in their CSR reports disclosures of labor policies specifically related to illegal and unethical 
labor practices, such as: labor trafficking, child labor, and forced labor. Apple’s CSR reports are dominated by 
disclosures related to labor in international factories producing Apple products. See also Nike (Marshall 1997; Knight 
and Greenberg 2002) and Del Monte (U.S. EEOC 2011) for examples of labor risk. 
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Hypothesis 1, that firms are more likely to issue voluntary CSR reports in industries 
exposed to higher labor pressure.  
 
[ Insert Table 10 ] 
  
E. Consideration of Distressed Firms 
Distressed firms, or firms a high probability of bankruptcy, face incentive effects 
associated with debt that non-distressed firms do not (see Jensen and Meckling 1978; 
Eisdorfer 2008). Using Altman’s Z-score (Altman 1968), I find 97 of the 347 CSR 
initiators in the sample period are classified as distressed at the time of disclosure 
initiation (CSR_YR1 = 1), having an Altman’s Z-score of less than 1.81. To minimize the 
risk of these highly levered firms biasing my study, I exclude distressed firms and re-
examine the results found in Table 5. The results of this sensitivity analysis are reported 
in Table 11. 
 
[ Insert Table 11 ] 
 
When the sample is partitioned by labor pressure and restricted to firms 
characterized as not distressed, 28 CSR initiating observations are dropped from the 
lower LP sample and 69 observations are dropped from the higher LP sample. In both 
estimations, LEV is consistent with prior results – positive, but not significant in the 
lower LP sample (coef: 0.336; p > 0.10), and positive and significant in the higher LP 
sample (coef: 2.052; p < 0.01). Furthermore, I find a positive and significant difference in 
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the coefficients of the two samples when distressed firms are excluded (coef: 1.806; p < 
0.05). The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest distressed firms do not influence the 
primary findings of my study. 
 
F. Endogeneity 
 Timing could be a source of potential endogeneity effects, particularly as the 
timing relates to debt issuances (impacting LEV) and advertising campaigns (impacting 
ADV_INT). By addressing timing concerns in Table 7, Column I, I am also addressing 
the endogenous timing effects impacting LEV and ADV_INT. The non-lagged results 
reported in Table 7 (Column I) remain consistent with the lagged regression model 
reported in Table 4, where non-lagged LP, LEV, ADV_INT, and the interaction LEV*LP 
all remain positive (coef: 10.774; 0.833; 52.641; and 2.327) and significantly associated 
with voluntary CSR initiation (p < 0.01; 0.01; 0.05; and 0.05). Although a firm may defer 
a debt issuance or major advertising campaign for a year to reap the reputational benefits 
of CSR issuance, it is less likely the reputational benefits of CSR are strong enough to 
influence a two-year hold in material capital market or marketing strategy for the firm. 
 
G. Firm-Specific Advertising Intensity 
Advertising intensity is calculated as ratio of reported annual advertising expense 
divided by average total assets per three-digit NAICS industry classification following 
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006), Casey and Grenier (2014) and Servaes and Tamayo 
(2013). As an additional analysis, I recalculate advertising intensity at the firm level as 
advertising expense (Compustat: XAD) scaled by total assets. As Compustat has many 
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missing data points for firm-level advertising expenditure, this specification decreases the 
sample size from 51,957 to 18,236. Despite the decrease in sample size, I find for a 
sample of 191 CSR reporters, the coefficients for LP, LEV, and the firm-level advertising 
measure are positive and significant (coef: 9.052; 0.4891; 1.933 and p < 0.001; 0.001, 
0.05, respectively). The interaction of LP and LEV also remains positive and significant 
(coef: 15.1626 and p < 0.01) with the alternate specification of customer pressure and the 
reduced sample size. These results suggest customer pressure at the firm level is 
positively and significantly associated with CSR disclosure.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The number of firms issuing voluntary CSR reports in the US is small, but 
steadily increasing from year to year. Despite the visibility and economic impact of these 
firms, extant literature provides limited information on what motivates their decision to 
engage in voluntary CSR disclosures (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). I examine the influence of 
labor, debtholders, customers, and capital structure strategy on determinants of voluntary, 
stand-alone CSR reports in order to expand our understanding of how the demand for 
voluntary non-financial disclosure arises and the influence of production-related frictions 
on firms’ voluntary disclosure activities. I find firms with high labor pressure, a high 
degree of leverage, and high levels of advertising intensity in the prior year are more 
likely to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year. Further, I examine the 
interactive influence of labor and leverage on the likelihood of a firm to engage in 
voluntary CSR disclosure activity. I find firms more likely to deploy high leverage as a 
capital market strategy to offset pecuniary labor compensation are also more likely to 
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initiate voluntary CSR reporting than their counterparts. My findings indicate labor, debt, 
and capital structure strategy influence voluntary disclosure activity. 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the prior CSR and voluntary 
disclosure literature by empirically examining stakeholder influence on the determinants 
of voluntary, stand-alone CSR reporting. I contribute to future Corporate Social 
Responsibility research by providing a model to control for selection bias related to the 
CSR disclosure decision. The model in this paper can be used as the first step in two-
staged research designs considering the consequences of CSR reporting and CSR quality. 
Furthermore, CSR reports represent a unique opportunity to examine the 
influence of stakeholders on voluntary disclosure and a forum for future research on the 
benefits, both financial and managerial, of voluntary disclosures on stakeholder 
interaction. My findings suggest opportunities for future research on the value of 
employee-related disclosures, specifically research on how CSR reports can be used to 
mitigate direct and indirect costs of the production function. 
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Appendix 1: CSR Report Content 
GRI G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
 
 
The following is an outline of CSR report content as recommended by the Global 
Reporting Initiative. Under G3 Guidelines,21 standard disclosures include: 
 
A. Firm Strategy and Profile 
This section includes strategy and analysis, a profile of the organization, report 
parameters; governance, commitments, and firm engagements; and a discussion 
of management approach and performance indicators. Often, these issues are 
addressed in the form of a letter from the CEO. 
 
B. Economic 
Economic CSR disclosures include firm performance, market presence, and a 
discussion of indirect economic impacts. 
 
C. Environmental 
Environmental disclosures discuss materials, energy, water, biodiversity, 
emissions/waste, products and services, compliance, and transport. 
 
D. Social – Labor Practices and Decent Work 
This section includes employee descriptives (i.e.: gender, geography, age), as well 
as disclosures relating to occupational health and safety; training and education, 
labor/management relations; diversity and equal opportunity; and equal 
remuneration for women and men.  
 
E. Social – Human Rights 
Human rights disclosures may discuss non-discrimination, employee’s freedom of 
association and right to engage in collective bargaining, child labor, forced labor,  
Indigenous rights, human rights investment, and remediation. 
 
F. Social – Society 
This section is intended to discuss interactions with local communities, public 
policy, compliance activities, anti-competitive behaviors, and corruption 
concerns/issues. 
 
G. Social – Product Responsibility 
Product responsibility disclosures include customer health and safety, product and 
service labeling, marketing communications, customer privacy, and compliance. 
  
 
                                                 
21 GRI’s G3 Guidelines were implemented in 2006 and can be found at www.globalreporting.org. 
49 
 
Appendix 2: Labor Pressure (LP) 
 
I define Labor pressure (LP) as an economic measure of employee bargaining 
power with the firm. As employee bargaining power increases, employees are able to 
demand greater compensation and exert wage pressure on the firm. In my study, 
bargaining power is measured as a function of the size of the employee bargaining unit 
and the importance of employees to the production function of the firm.  
One way employees improve their bargaining power is to unionize and bargain 
with the firm in larger, collective units. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012 Union 
Members report notes unionized employees have median usual weekly earnings that are 
27 percent higher than those who were not union members. Bargaining power, however, 
is not just a function of the percentage of employees participating in the collective 
bargaining unit, but also a function of the importance of employees to the production 
function of the firm. To that end, the variable LP in this study is intended to capture not 
just unionization of employees, but the larger degree of influence held by employee 
stakeholders over a firm’s production function. 
 Hilary (2006) and Chen et al. (2011) suggest labor strength (bargaining power) is 
a product of the unionization rate and labor intensity, where labor intensity is measured 
as the number of employees scaled by total assets – a measure also known as the labor to 
capital ratio. Further discussion of each component can be found below: 
 
Unionization  
Under the Labor-Management-Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMDRA), 
labor unions and firms are not required file copies of collective bargaining agreements 
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with the US Department of Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards (OLMS).22 
As such, firm-specific data relating to the number of employees covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement (unionized employees) is only disclosed by voluntary firm or 
employee action.  
As firm-specific data is difficult to obtain and may be incomplete per publicly 
available resources, researchers turn to industry measures of unionization, notably the 
Hirsch and Macpherson database at unionstats.com. In the Hirsch and Macpherson 
database, union data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly Current 
Population Survey. A description of the Union Membership Coverage Database can be 
found in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). I specifically collect Hirsch and Macpherson 
data on union membership, coverage, density, and employment by industry for the 
sample period. The data is provided by Census Industrial Classification Codes, which are 
then converted into NAICS codes at the two-, three-, four-, and five-digit level depending 
on specification for the CIC industry.  
 
Labor Intensity 
Classical economists, including Adam Smith and David Ricardo, describe the 
production of a firm with the following function:  
 
Y = f (L, K, N) 
  
, where Y is firm production, L is land, K is capital, and N is labor.  
                                                 
22 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, As Amended. See Right to Copies of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements (29 U.S.C. 414). 
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Capital can be defined as financial capital (funds used to operate and expand 
business) or fixed capital (plant, property, equipment). In this study, land and capital are 
combined and measured as the total assets of a firm.23 The labor to capital ratio, also 
referred to as labor intensity (Hilary 2006; Chen, Chen, and Liao 2011; Chen, Chen, and 
Wang 2012), is a measure of the sensitivity of a firm’s production function to labor.  
 
Labor Pressure 
Firms with high labor intensity have a greater sensitivity to economic factors, 
such as workforce supply and unemployment rates. In the presence of organized labor, 
labor sensitive firms are subject to the bargaining pressures of employees not as a single 
unit, but as collective units. Following Hilary (2006); Chen et al. (2011); and Chen et al. 
(2012), I interact labor intensity with the Hirsch and Macpherson unionization rate at the 
greatest level of firm specificity. For a better understanding of the labor pressure 
measure, below is an example of LP calculated for firms across two different three-digit 
NAICS industries for the year 2011. The Crop Production industry (three-digit NAICS: 
111) has a Hirsh and Macpherson unionization rate of 0.0190 for all firms at the three-
digit NAICS level. I also include the top 20 percent of firms, based on total assets, from 
the 2011 Food Manufacturing industry (three-digit NAICS: 311). Hirsch and Macpherson 
identify a total of seven different unionization rates for the Food Manufacturing industry, 
five of which are represented in the top 20 percent sample.  
I include data on whether or not firms issued a CSR report in 2011, but it should 
be noted that not all firms who issue CSR reports do so continuously. Chiquita Brands 
International, for example, issued a CSR report in 2010, but not in 2011.  
                                                 
23 For sensitivity analysis of the combined capital and land measure of total assets, see Section V. 
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Appendix 2: Labor Pressure (LP) – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor Unionization
Company Name EMP ÷ AT = Intensity * Rate = LP LP * 1,000 CSR
NAICS 111: Crop Production
DOLE FOOD CO INC 71.00 4,270.07 0.0166 0.0190 0.0003 0.3159 Yes
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTL INC 21.00 1,937.96 0.0108 0.0190 0.0002 0.2059
YASHENG GROUP 15.00 2,057.50 0.0073 0.0190 0.0001 0.1385
ROYAL HAWAIIAN ORCHARDS-LP 0.29 57.04 0.0051 0.0190 0.0001 0.0966
LIMONEIRA CO 0.20 159.03 0.0013 0.0190 0.0000 0.0243
TEJON RANCH CO 0.15 321.98 0.0005 0.0190 0.0000 0.0086
ALICO INC 0.13 180.04 0.0007 0.0190 0.0000 0.0141
VIASPACE INC 0.10 10.21 0.0102 0.0190 0.0002 0.1935
NAICS 311: Food Manufacturing
TYSON FOODS INC  -CL A 115.00 11,071.00 0.0104 0.2030 0.0021 2.1087 Yes
SMITHFIELD FOODS INC 46.35 7,611.80 0.0061 0.2030 0.0012 1.2361 Yes
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP 39.50 2,879.55 0.0137 0.2030 0.0028 2.7846
LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP 11.71 9,263.19 0.0013 0.2030 0.0003 0.2566
CAMPBELL SOUP CO 17.50 6,862.00 0.0026 0.1780 0.0005 0.4539 Yes
SMUCKER (JM) CO 4.50 8,324.58 0.0005 0.1780 0.0001 0.0962 Yes
DEAN FOODS CO 24.07 5,754.36 0.0042 0.1370 0.0006 0.5730
PEPSICO INC 297.00 72,882.00 0.0041 0.1020 0.0004 0.4157 Yes
COCA-COLA CO 146.20 79,974.00 0.0018 0.1020 0.0002 0.1865 Yes
GENERAL MILLS INC 35.00 18,674.50 0.0019 0.0940 0.0002 0.1762 Yes
BUNGE LTD 34.00 23,275.00 0.0015 0.0940 0.0001 0.1373 Yes
KELLOGG CO 30.67 11,901.00 0.0026 0.0940 0.0002 0.2423 Yes
Variable Descriptions
Labor Pressure (LP) Calculation - 2011 NAICS Industry Sample
EMP                 =    The number of 2011 employees reported for the firm per Compustat.
AT                    =    Total assets (AT) reported for the firm in 2011 per Compustat.
LP                     =    Labor pressure per this study and Hilary (2006); Chen, Chen and Liao (2011) and Chen, Chen and Wang (2012 WIP).
CSR                  =   Yes if 2011 is a year in which a firm issues a CSR report (CSR_PUBYR==1).
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1A: 
 
US CSR Reports 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1B: 
   
 
 
 
Figures 1A & B, above, indicate the number of stand-alone CSR reports 
issued each year from 1993 to 2012 per data found at CorporateRegister.com 
Global CSR Reports 
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Dependent Variables
CSR_YR1 =
CSR_PUBYR =
Independent Variables
LP =
LP_RISK =
LEV =
LEV * LP =
ADV_INT =
SIZEMVE =
REG =
GLOBAL =
PCT_CSR =
COMPETITION =
ROA =
TOBINQ =
LITRISK =
percentage of firms issuing CSR reports in year t  per three-digit NAICS industry codes. 
CSR reports are identified via CorporateRegister.com.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year following Dhaliwal et al. (2011) 
and Lang and Ludholm (1993). Measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of 
common equity (PRCC_F * CSHO) at the beginning of each year.
the interaction between the leverage ratio and labor pressure.
Tobin's Q, measured as the market value of common equity plus the book value of 
preferred stock (PSTKL), book value of long-term debt (DLTT) and current liability 
(LCT), scaled by the book value of total assets.
1 if SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise. Per Dhaliwal et al. (2011) high-
litigation industries include SIC codes of: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961
and 7370.
indicator variable that equals 1 if the two-digit SIC code industry is considered regulated 
per Weiss and Klass (1986) and Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010); 0 otherwise.
total return on assets per firm year measured as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by total assets (AT) at the beginning of year t .
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1. I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
by summing the squares of the market shares of the 50 largest companies in a three-digit 
NAICS industry. I then calculate a firm's market share by dividing the sales (SALE) of a 
firm in year t  by the total sales of all the 50 largest companies in a three-digit NAICS 
code industry in that year. In cases where there are fewer than 50 companies in an 
industry, I use all companies in that industry to calculate the market share of each firm.
the advertising intensity for the three-digit NAICS industry for the year; defined as the 
ratio of annual advertising expense divided by average total assets.
Table 1
Variable Descriptions
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income (Compustat 
PIFO); 0 otherwise.
labor pressure, calculated as firm-level labor intensity interacted with the industry 
unionization rate. Labor intensity is Compustat EMP scaled by AT for each firm (Hilary, 
2006) and unionization rate data comes from the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database at unionstats.com (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003).
leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by total assets.
1 in the first year t  (initiating year) a public US firm issues a stand alone CSR report per 
CorporateRegister.com; 0 in any non-initiating year t  or for all non-CSR report issuers. 
The control group (CSR_YR1=0) represents all years in which no CSR reports are issued.
1 for years in which a public US firm issues a CSR report per CorporateRegister.com; 
0 otherwise.
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a three-digit NAICS industry at higher risk 
for child labor or forced labor per the United States Department of Labor and 
International Labor Affairs Bureau's List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or 
Forced Labor ; 0 otherwise.
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All Compustat Observations (2002 - 2012 ) 121,584
Firms 18,776
Drop observations with missing:
19,699
19,467
15,994
7,134
6,979
354
Sample Observations (N ) 51,957
Sample Firms ( n ) 8,720   
Full US CSR Reports
Year Sample CR.com2 CSR Firms Initiators
2002 5,226 109 79 18 2 3%
2003 4,872 116 65 15 8 12%
2004 4,978 134 90 17 16 18%
2005 4,885 161 101 25 27 27%
2006 4,874 177 116 23 38 33%
2007 4,719 210 135 25 40 30%
2008 4,681 250 167 37 57 34%
2009 4,664 299 198 55 73 37%
2010 4,506 381 265 65 97 37%
2011 4,303 402 284 42 120 42%
2012 4,249 400 288 25 143 50%
Obs. (N ) 51,957 2,639 1,788 347 621
Firms (n ) 8,720 494 454 347 206
Full Sample
     Profitability (ROA )
     Labor Pressure (LP )
GRI Used
Final CSR Report Sample
Panel B:  CSR Report Data for Public Firms
1   Represents the number of publicly traded firms issuing US stand-alone CSR reports per CorporateRegister.com.
     Employees (EMP )
     Mkt. Value Equity (SIZEMVE)
     Growth (TOBINQ)
Panel A:  Sample Determination
     Total Assets (AT)
Table 2
Sample Details
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Panel C: Industry Details
Two-Digit NAICS Industry Sectors CSR CSR
CSR Reporting Sample: Initiation Reports
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
1
0 8
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 23 131
22 Utilities 19 48
23 Construction 4 17
31 Manufacturing 27 139
32 Manufacturing 49 407
33 Manufacturing 96 497
42 Wholesale Trade 7 26
44 Retail Trade 17 67
45 Retail Trade 8 39
48 Transportation and Warehousing 14 62
49 Transportation and Warehousing 1 18
51 Information 28 132
52 Finance and Insurance 11 39
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 5 14
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 13 51
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 8 24
61 Educational Services 1 6
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 6 17
72 Accommodation and Food Services 10 46
347 1,788
Non-CSR Reporting Sectors
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
81 Other Services (except Public Administration)
92 Public Administration
1 The Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting NAICS classification (11) contains three firms that issued CSR reports in the 2002 to 
2012 sample period, but issued their first (initiation) CSR report prior to 2002. 
Table 2
Sample Details - Continued
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Mean
Diff
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-value
LP 0.0007 0.0002 0.0109 0.0007 0.0002 0.0109 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 -5.2607 ***
LEV 0.3022 0.1572 0.6397 0.3026 0.1561 0.6417 0.2517 0.2320 0.1672 -5.3914 ***
ADV_INT 0.0115 0.0085 0.0135 0.0115 0.0085 0.0135 0.0125 0.0081 0.0168 1.0493
SIZEMVE 5.1292 5.2047 2.3676 5.1053 5.1847 2.3560 8.5378 8.5620 1.3203 47.8964 ***
REG 0.2182 0.0000 0.4131 0.2177 0.0000 0.4127 0.2939 0.0000 0.4562 3.1039 ***
GLOBAL 0.2930 0.0000 0.4551 0.2903 0.0000 0.4539 0.6772 1.0000 0.4682 15.3435 ***
PCT_CSR 0.0252 0.0173 0.0286 0.0250 0.0173 0.0283 0.0559 0.0426 0.0469 12.2826 ***
COMPETITION -0.0751 -0.0583 0.0718 -0.0751 -0.0583 0.0717 -0.0808 -0.0610 0.0760 -1.3871
ROA -0.3067 0.0175 1.4532 -0.3093 0.0171 1.4579 0.0639 0.0579 0.0839 46.9453 ***
TOBINQ 3.5520 1.4860 8.8719 3.5650 1.4870 8.9012 1.6908 1.3653 1.0178 -27.6799 ***
LITRISK 0.5479 1.0000 0.4977 0.5484 1.0000 0.4977 0.4640 0.0000 0.4994 -3.1398 ***
N 49,894 49,547 347
n 8,602 8,584 347
CSR_YR1
LP
LEV
ADV_INT
SIZEMVE
REG
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, *   Indicate the difference between means is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
=  size using the market value of equity.
=  1 if the industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
       GLOBAL
       PCT_CSR
       COMPETITION
       ROA
       TOBINQ
       LITRISK
CSR_YR1 = 0 CSR_YR1 = 1
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
=  1 for CSR initiation year; 0 otherwise.
=  labor pressure.
=  leverage ratio.
=  advertising intensity.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A:   Statistics for Non-CSR Issuing Observations vs. CSR Issuing Observations
Full Sample Non-CSR Initiation Obs CSR Initiation Obs
=  Tobin's Q.
=  1 if industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
=  1 if reporting non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
=  percentage of CSR reports industry year.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
=  total return on assets per firm year.
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CSR_YR1 LP LEV ADV_INT SIZEMVE REG GLOBAL PCT_CSR ROA TOBINQ LITRISK
CSR_YR1 1 0.004 0.027 -0.007 0.115 0.015 0.071 0.075 -0.007 0.049 -0.013 -0.014
LP -0.002 1 0.190 -0.018 -0.123 -0.014 -0.027 0.048 -0.032 0.031 -0.096 -0.199
LEV -0.007 0.077 1 -0.102 0.030 0.165 -0.057 -0.015 -0.119 -0.126 -0.102 -0.235
ADV_INT 0.006 -0.007 -0.023 1 -0.040 -0.406 0.038 0.078 0.241 -0.059 0.148 0.493
SIZEMVE 0.121 -0.039 -0.211 -0.008 1 0.123 0.293 0.093 -0.058 0.409 -0.011 -0.094
REG 0.015 0.020 0.026 -0.218 0.127 1 -0.180 0.017 -0.209 0.054 -0.106 -0.582
GLOBAL 0.071 -0.016 -0.104 -0.007 0.282 -0.180 1 0.092 0.108 0.152 -0.055 0.136
PCT_CSR 0.090 0.004 -0.006 0.083 0.113 0.071 0.052 1 0.192 0.003 -0.036 0.078
COMP. -0.007 -0.012 0.005 -0.122 -0.021 -0.113 0.082 -0.031 1 -0.139 0.127 0.435
ROA 0.021 -0.059 -0.448 0.004 0.286 0.037 0.130 0.016 -0.043 1 -0.022 -0.123
TOBINQ -0.018 0.136 0.557 0.006 -0.214 -0.051 -0.118 -0.033 0.035 -0.604 1 0.219
LITRISK -0.014 -0.029 -0.035 0.248 -0.091 -0.582 0.136 -0.047 0.289 -0.070 0.084 1
CSR_YR1 = 1 if t  is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
LP =  labor pressure.
LEV =  leverage ratio.
ADV_INT =  advertising intensity.
SIZEMVE =  the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
REG =  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
GLOBAL =  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
PCT_CSR =  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
COMP. =  COMPETITION: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
ROA =  total return on assets per firm year.
TOBINQ =  Tobin's Q.
LITRISK =  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
A correlation coefficient in bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level.
Table 3 - Continued
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel B:   Pearson (bottom)/Spearman Correlation
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
COMP.
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Variables Sign Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob.
LPt-1 + 12.414 2.755 0.000 *** 12.387 2.755 0.000 *** 12.530 2.781 0.000 *** 11.258 3.292 0.001 ***
LEVt-1 + 0.786 0.183 0.000 *** 0.785 0.183 0.000 *** 0.827 0.181 0.000 *** 1.262 0.232 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 + 2.500 0.693 0.000 *** 2.508 0.694 0.000 *** 2.122 0.814 0.009 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 55.942 22.228 0.012 ** 55.943 22.228 0.012 ** 55.715 22.279 0.012 ** 57.452 32.964 0.081 *
SIZEMVEt-1 + 0.644 0.029 0.000 *** 0.644 0.029 0.000 *** 0.651 0.030 0.000 *** 0.565 0.034 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- 0.040 0.532 0.940 0.040 0.532 0.939 0.038 0.537 0.944 -0.198 0.636 0.756
GLOBALt-1 + 0.864 0.138 0.000 *** 0.864 0.138 0.000 *** 0.891 0.141 0.000 *** 1.018 0.178 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 26.462 3.459 0.000 *** 26.463 3.459 0.000 *** 26.910 3.669 0.000 *** 27.765 4.619 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + 3.177 3.432 0.355 3.177 3.432 0.355 3.112 3.431 0.364 -0.925 4.332 0.831
ROAt-1 + 1.860 0.527 0.000 *** 1.861 0.527 0.000 *** 1.846 0.537 0.001 *** 2.209 0.649 0.001 ***
TOBINQt-1 - -0.296 0.071 0.000 *** -0.296 0.071 0.000 *** -0.297 0.072 0.000 *** -0.280 0.083 0.001 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.259 0.304 0.393 -0.259 0.304 0.393 -0.260 0.305 0.394 -0.215 0.590 0.716
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2467 0.2467 0.2481 0.2284
Pseudo likelihood -1,551 -1,551 -1,493 -981
N: number of obs. 48,397 48,397 47,781 29,440
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1) 347     347     333     215     
CSR_YR1 =
LPt-1 =
LEVt-1 =
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 =
ADV_INT t-1 =
SIZEMVEt-1 =
REGt-1 =
COMPETITIONt-1
ROAt-1
=  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
=  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
=  total return on assets per firm year.
=  Tobin's Q.
1 if t  is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
labor pressure.
leverage ratio.
the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.
GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
LITRISKt-1
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
With Interaction (II)CSR Initiation (I)
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
advertising intensity.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
TOBINQt-1
Environmental (IV)
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
Excluding Utilities (III)
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
Table 4
Determinants of CSR Initiation
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
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CSR_YR1 = Sign Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob.
LEVt-1 + 0.295 0.371 0.790 0.427 1.171 0.277 4.230 0.000 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 84.120 44.490 1.890 0.059 * 51.848 24.919 2.080 0.037 **
SIZEMVEt-1 + 0.701 0.047 14.870 0.000 *** 0.618 0.038 16.070 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- -0.222 0.938 -0.240 0.813 0.056 0.629 0.090 0.929
GLOBALt-1 + 1.116 0.240 4.650 0.000 *** 0.681 0.177 3.860 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 24.746 8.372 2.960 0.003 *** 27.854 4.473 6.230 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + -1.217 5.606 -0.220 0.828 8.007 5.286 1.510 0.130
ROAt-1 + 1.338 0.586 2.290 0.022 ** 2.051 0.914 2.240 0.025 **
TOBINQt-1 - -0.198 0.093 -2.140 0.032 ** -0.375 0.105 -3.560 0.000 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.535 0.393 -1.360 0.173 -0.018 0.657 -0.030 0.978
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.2784 0.2312
-622 -909
24,423 23,201
140     207      
Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef.  (Prob. ) 
2
0.098 *
LPt-1
LEVt-1
ADV_INT t-1
SIZEMVEt-1
REGt-1
GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
COMPETITIONt-1
ROAt-1
TOBINQt-1
LITRISKt-1
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  
Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in 
all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
=  total return on assets per firm year.
=  Tobin's Q.
=  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
=  leverage ratio.
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
=  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
1
   The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP 
      are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".
Table 5
Determinants of CSR Initiation - Partitioned by Labor Pressure
Lower  LP  (I)
1
Higher  LP  (II)
1
=  labor pressure.
=  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
2
   Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 10% level.
Year Indicators
Industry Indicators
Pseudo R2
Pseudo likelihood
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1)
=  advertising intensity.
=  the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
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Variables Sign Odds Ratio SE z Prob. Odds Ratio SE z Prob. Odds Ratio SE z Prob.
LPt-1 + 239,598     660,153  4.500 0.000   +
LEVt-1 + 2.193 0.402 4.290 0.000   + 1.343 0.498 0.790 0.427 3.227 0.894 4.230 0.000   +
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 + 12.179 8.435 3.610 0.000   +
ADV_INTt-1 +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 2.520 0.012   +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 1.890 0.059   +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 2.080 0.037   +
SIZEMVEt-1 + 1.905 0.056 22.030 0.000   + 2.016 0.095 14.870 0.000   + 1.855 0.071 16.070 0.000   +
REGt-1 +/- 1.041 0.554 0.080 0.939 0.801 0.752 -0.240 0.813 1.058 0.666 0.090 0.929
GLOBALt-1 + 2.373 0.328 6.250 0.000   + 3.054 0.733 4.650 0.000   + 1.977 0.349 3.860 0.000   +
PCT_CSRt-1 +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 7.650 0.000   +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 2.960 0.003   +  > 1 Bil.  > 1 Bil. 6.230 0.000   +
COMPETITIONt-1 + 23.977 82.289 0.930 0.355 0.296 1.660 -0.220 0.828 3,002         15,866  1.510 0.13
ROAt-1 + 6.428 3.388 3.530 0.000   + 3.811 2.232 2.290 0.022   + 7.779 7.112 2.240 0.025   +
TOBINQt-1 - 0.744 0.053 -4.170 0.000   - 0.820 0.076 -2.140 0.032   - 0.687 0.072 -3.560 0.000   -
LITRISKt-1 +/- 0.771 0.234 -0.850 0.393 0.586 0.230 -1.360 0.173 0.982 0.646 -0.030 0.978
Indicators
2
Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2467 0.2784 0.2312
Pseudo likelihood -1,551 -622 -909
N: number of obs. 48,397 24,423 23,201
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1) 347     140     207     
CSR_YR1 =
LPt-1 =
LEVt-1 =
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 =
ADV_INT t-1 =
SIZEMVEt-1 =
Note:  This table presents logistic regression results reporting odds ratios where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.   Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-
statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure. + (-) Indicate the variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable and the odds of CSR initiation increases (decreases) if the odds ratio for the 
independent variable is greater than 1 (less than 1).
 LITRISKt-1 =  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
1
   The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".
2
   The estimation includes both year and indisutry (three-digit NAICS) indicator variables.
advertising intensity.  ROAt-1 =  total return on assets per firm year.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.  TOBINQt-1 =  Tobin's Q.
labor pressure.  GLOBALt-1 =  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.  COMPETITIONt-1
Table 6
Logit Model Estimating Odds Ratios
CSR Initiation Sample Lower  LP  (I)
1
Higher  LP  (II)
1
Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1 Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1
leverage ratio.  PCT_CSRt-1 =  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
1 if t is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.  REGt-1 =  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
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Variables Sign Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob.
LPt-1 + 10.744 2.654 4.050 0.000 *** 14.843 2.801 5.300 0.000 *** 12.498 2.787 4.480 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 + 0.833 0.171 4.860 0.000 *** 0.851 0.184 4.620 0.000 *** 0.825 0.184 4.490 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 + 2.327 0.940 2.470 0.013 ** 2.993 0.739 4.050 0.000 *** 2.536 0.704 3.600 0.000 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 52.641 22.199 2.370 0.018 ** 48.969 20.669 2.370 0.018 ** 56.234 22.586 2.490 0.013 **
SIZEMVEt-1 + 0.669 0.028 24.020 0.000 *** 0.886 0.037 23.770 0.000 *** 0.721 0.031 22.900 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- -0.005 0.532 -0.010 0.992 0.371 0.503 0.740 0.460 0.064 0.525 0.120 0.903
GLOBALt-1 + 0.832 0.139 5.990 0.000 *** 1.231 0.137 8.990 0.000 *** 0.930 0.136 6.850 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 26.655 3.486 7.650 0.000 *** 28.576 3.326 8.590 0.000 *** 27.350 3.463 7.900 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + 5.432 3.640 1.490 0.136 2.443 3.431 0.710 0.476 2.727 3.514 0.780 0.438
ROAt-1 + 0.257 0.304 0.850 0.398 1.842 0.602 3.060 0.002 *** 1.796 0.548 3.280 0.001 ***
TOBINQt-1 - -0.241 0.065 -3.680 0.000 *** -0.344 0.072 -4.770 0.000 *** -0.299 0.071 -4.210 0.000 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.296 0.306 -0.970 0.333 -0.335 0.322 -1.040 0.298 -0.264 0.306 -0.860 0.388
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2443 0.3174 0.2696
Pseudo likelihood -1,556 -1,395 -1,500
N: number of obs. 48,396 46,393 47,635
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1) 347   347   347   
CSR_YR1 =  REGt-1 =  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
LPt-1 = labor pressure.  GLOBALt-1
LEVt-1 = leverage ratio.  PCT_CSRt-1 =  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 = the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.  COMPETITIONt-1 =  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
ADV_INT t-1 = advertising intensity.  ROAt-1 =  total return on assets per firm year.
SIZEMVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.  TOBINQt-1 =  Tobin's Q.
 LITRISKt-1 =  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
(I) (II) (III)
CSR Initiation
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
1 if t  is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
Table 7
CSR Report Initiation Sample Sensitivity
CSR Initiation CSR Initiation
No Lag Drop Firms Post-CSR Initiation
Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1
Drop Consistent CSR Reporters Only
Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1 Dependent Variable: CSR_YR1
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Variables Sign Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob.
LPt-1 + 15.628 1.493 10.470 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 + 0.696 0.141 4.920 0.000 *** 0.307 0.250 1.230 0.219 0.980 0.213 4.610 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 + 2.653 0.407 6.510 0.000 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 12.984 12.170 1.070 0.286 35.694 22.837 1.560 0.118 3.506 15.225 0.230 0.818
SIZEMVEt-1 + 1.063 0.022 47.730 0.000 *** 1.205 0.037 32.530 0.000 *** 1.012 0.030 34.060 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- 0.584 0.271 2.150 0.031 ** -0.863 0.630 -1.370 0.170 0.856 0.324 2.640 0.008 ***
GLOBALt-1 + 1.500 0.075 19.880 0.000 *** 1.435 0.128 11.240 0.000 *** 1.498 0.095 15.720 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 20.908 1.494 13.990 0.000 *** 31.556 4.019 7.850 0.000 *** 19.426 1.734 11.200 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + -1.426 1.960 -0.730 0.467 -2.006 3.286 -0.610 0.541 -0.540 2.949 -0.180 0.855
ROAt-1 + 0.787 0.262 3.010 0.003 *** 0.618 0.422 1.460 0.144 0.467 0.344 1.360 0.174
TOBINQt-1 - -0.365 0.036 -10.080 0.000 *** -0.265 0.048 -5.550 0.000 *** -0.447 0.055 -8.210 0.000 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.226 0.178 -1.270 0.205 -0.508 0.235 -2.160 0.031 ** -0.612 0.439 -1.390 0.164
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.4639 0.5099 0.4363
Pseudo likelihood -4,117 -1,569 -2,488
N: number of obs. 49,033 24,669 23,931
n: (dep. var.  CSR_PUBYR = 1) 1,788   140     207     
Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef.  (Prob. ) 
2
0.002 ***
CSR_PUBYR =
LPt-1 =
LEVt-1 =
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 =
ADV_INT t-1 =
SIZEMVEt-1 =
1 for years in which a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
labor pressure.  GLOBALt-1
Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR
 REGt-1
 COMPETITIONt-1
Table 8
Ongoing CSR Reporting
CSR Reporting Sample Lower  LP  (I)
1
Higher  LP  (II)
1
Dependent Variable: CSR_PUBYR
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
=  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
=  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
=  total return on assets per firm year.
=  Tobin's Q.
=  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
leverage ratio.
the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.
advertising intensity.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
 PCT_CSRt-1
 LITRISKt-1
 ROAt-1
 TOBINQt-1
1
   The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".
2
   Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 1% level.
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
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Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
LPt-1 18.557 *** 18.451 *** 8.304 *** 8.281 *** 12.577 *** 12.540 *** 18.275 *** 18.239 ***
LEVt-1 0.834 *** 0.833 *** 0.785 *** 0.785 *** 0.920 *** 0.919 *** 0.551 *** 0.549 ***
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 4.613 *** 1.356 * 1.770 *** 3.319 ***
ADV_INTt-1 36.262 36.269 81.450 ** 81.448 ** 23.051 23.053 8.086 8.083
SIZEMVEt-1 0.756 *** 0.756 *** 0.708 *** 0.708 *** 1.170 *** 1.170 *** 1.073 *** 1.073 ***
REGt-1 0.276 0.276 -0.044 -0.044 1.248 *** 1.248 *** 0.251 0.251
GLOBALt-1 1.182 *** 1.182 *** 0.897 *** 0.897 *** 1.946 *** 1.946 *** 1.550 *** 1.550 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 22.157 *** 22.159 *** 32.837 *** 32.838 *** 16.754 *** 16.755 *** 21.573 *** 21.575 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 9.837 ** 9.837 ** -4.693 -4.694 -2.942 -2.942 -0.415 -0.415
ROAt-1 3.134 *** 3.135 *** 1.060 ** 1.061 ** 0.581 * 0.582 * 0.898 *** 0.900 ***
TOBINQt-1 -0.459 *** -0.459 *** -0.190 ** -0.190 ** -0.261 *** -0.261 *** -0.440 *** -0.440 ***
LITRISKt-1 -0.218 -0.218 -0.308 -0.308 -0.158 -0.158 -0.238 -0.238
Pseudo R2 0.3027 0.2571 0.4948 0.4329
Pseudo likelihood -768 -868 -2,251 -2,457
N: number of obs. 45,066 43,907 45,446 44,949
n: (dep. var. = 1) 167     180     909     880     
CSR_YR1 = 1 if t  is the first year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise. =  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.
CSR_PUBYR = 1 for years in which a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise. =  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
LPt-1 = labor pressure. =  percentage of CSR reports per NAICS industry year.
LEVt-1 = leverage ratio. =  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 = the interaction between leverage and labor pressure. =  total return on assets per firm year.
ADV_INT t-1 = advertising intensity. =  Tobin's Q.
SIZEMVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of each year. =  1 if the industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
Table 9
Consistent and Non-Consistent CSR Reporting
Consistent CSR Non-Consistent CSR
Ongoing CSR Reporting
Dep. Variable: CSR_PUBYR
Consistent CSR Non-Consistent CSR
CSR Initiation
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure. All models in 
this table include year and NAICS industry fixed effects.
REGt-1
GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
COMPETITIONt-1
ROAt-1
TOBINQt-1
LITRISKt-1
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Variables Sign Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob. Coef. SE Prob.
LPt-1 + 12.414 2.755 0.000 *** 12.387 2.755 0.000 *** 12.387 2.755 0.000 ***
LP_RISKt-1 + 1.484 0.705 0.035 ** 1.491 0.705 0.034 **
LEVt-1 + 0.783 0.183 0.000 *** 0.786 0.183 0.000 *** 0.785 0.183 0.000 *** 0.785 0.183 0.000 ***
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 + 2.500 0.693 0.000 *** 2.500 0.693 0.000 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 55.902 22.225 0.012 ** 55.942 22.228 0.012 ** 55.943 22.228 0.012 ** 55.943 22.228 0.012 **
SIZEMVEt-1 + 0.644 0.029 0.000 *** 0.644 0.029 0.000 *** 0.644 0.029 0.000 *** 0.644 0.029 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- 0.036 0.531 0.946 0.040 0.532 0.940 0.040 0.532 0.939 0.040 0.532 0.939
GLOBALt-1 + 0.864 0.138 0.000 *** 0.864 0.138 0.000 *** 0.864 0.138 0.000 *** 0.864 0.138 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 26.449 3.458 0.000 *** 26.462 3.459 0.000 *** 26.463 3.459 0.000 *** 26.463 3.459 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + 3.178 3.431 0.354 3.177 3.432 0.355 3.177 3.432 0.355 3.177 3.432 0.355
ROAt-1 + 1.854 0.526 0.000 *** 1.860 0.527 0.000 *** 1.861 0.527 0.000 *** 1.861 0.527 0.000 ***
TOBINQt-1 - -0.294 0.071 0.000 *** -0.296 0.071 0.000 *** -0.296 0.071 0.000 *** -0.296 0.071 0.000 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.260 0.304 0.391 -0.259 0.304 0.393 -0.259 0.304 0.393 -0.259 0.304 0.393
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2466 0.2467 0.2467 0.2467
Pseudo likelihood -1,551 -1,551 -1,551 -1,551
N: number of obs. 48,397 48,397 48,397 48,397
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1) 347     347     347     347     
CSR_YR1 =
LPt-1 =
LP_RISKt-1 =
LEVt-1 =
LEVt-1 *  LPt-1 =
ADV_INT t-1 =
SIZEMVEt-1 =
labor pressure.
1 if the labor risk is higher for the industry; 0 otherwise.
GLOBALt-1
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
(III) (IV)(I) (II)
Comprehensive LP
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
leverage ratio. COMPETITIONt-1
High Risk LP Unionized LP
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
PCT_CSRt-1
advertising intensity.
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
=  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
Table 10
Additional Tests of Labor Pressure
TOBINQt-1 =  Tobin's Q.
LITRISKt-1
ROAt-1 =  total return on assets per firm year.
Including Interaction
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
=  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
REGt-1 =  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k is regulated; 0 otherwise.
Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1 Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1 Dep. Variable: CSR_YR1
the interaction between leverage and labor pressure.
1 if t  is the 1st year a firm issues a CSR report; 0 otherwise.
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CSR_YR1 = Sign Coef. SE z Prob. Coef. SE z Prob.
LEVt-1 + 0.336 0.494 0.680 0.495 2.052 0.611 3.360 0.001 ***
ADV_INTt-1 + 64.716 44.238 1.460 0.143 49.277 26.622 1.850 0.064 *
SIZEMVEt-1 + 1.012 0.073 13.880 0.000 *** 0.953 0.071 13.510 0.000 ***
REGt-1 +/- -4.601 0.614 -7.490 0.000 *** 0.916 0.795 1.150 0.249
GLOBALt-1 + 1.325 0.260 5.100 0.000 *** 1.065 0.230 4.620 0.000 ***
PCT_CSRt-1 + 32.286 9.543 3.380 0.001 *** 37.326 6.140 6.080 0.000 ***
COMPETITIONt-1 + 3.512 5.917 0.590 0.553 13.773 8.441 1.630 0.103
ROAt-1 + 0.650 0.881 0.740 0.460 1.764 1.193 1.480 0.139
TOBINQt-1 - -0.199 0.098 -2.030 0.043 ** -0.369 0.120 -3.070 0.002 ***
LITRISKt-1 +/- -0.332 0.517 -0.640 0.521 -0.183 0.913 -0.200 0.841
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.3247 0.3183
-437 -522
13,355 13,070
112     138      
Difference in Lower/Higher LEVt-1 Coef.  (Prob. ) 
2
0.017 **
LPt-1
LEVt-1
ADV_INT t-1
SIZEMVEt-1
REGt-1
GLOBALt-1
PCT_CSRt-1
COMPETITIONt-1
ROAt-1
TOBINQt-1
LITRISKt-1
Pseudo likelihood
=  the market value of equity at the beginning of each year.
=  1 if the two-digit SIC industry k  is regulated; 0 otherwise.
Industry Indicators
Table 11
CSR Report Initiation: Partitioned by Labor Pressure and Excluding Distressed Firms
Lower  LP  (I)
1
Higher  LP  (II)
1
Year Indicators
=  advertising intensity.
=  1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income; 0 otherwise.
2
   Additional testing finds the coefficients for LEVt-1 from (I) and (II) are statistically different at the 5% level.
=  1 if two-digit SIC industry k  is a high litigation-risk; 0 otherwise.
Pseudo R2
N: number of obs.
n: (dep. var.  CSR_YR1 = 1)
For detailed variable descriptions, see Table 1
=  labor pressure.
=  leverage ratio.
Note: This table presents logistic regression results where all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, **, *  Indicate the 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimated standard errors used in all models. All t-
statistics are corrected using the Huber-White Procedure.
=  percentage of CSR reports per three-digit NAICS industry year.
=  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index multiplied by -1.
=  total return on assets per firm year.
=  Tobin's Q.
1
   The sample is partitioned in two halves based on the variable LP. Observations with smaller values for LP 
      are in the "Lower LP" partition, while the observations with larger LP are in "Higher LP".
